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Reasonable Doubt and Relativity 
Michael D. Cicchini* 
Abstract 
 
In theory, the Constitution protects us against criminal 
conviction unless the state can prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In reality, this lofty standard is only as strong as the words 
used to explain it to the jury. 
Unfortunately, attempts to explain reasonable doubt often 
create confusion, and sometimes even diminish the burden of proof. 
Many courts therefore believe that the better practice is not to 
attempt a definition. However, empirical studies demonstrate that 
reasonable doubt is not self-defining, i.e., when it is not explained 
to the jury, it offers defendants no greater protection against 
conviction than the two lower, civil burdens of proof. 
To solve this dilemma, courts should explain reasonable doubt 
on a relative basis, within the context of the civil burdens of proof. 
A relative, context-based instruction will allow jurors to compare 
and contrast the different standards, thus giving them the 
necessary reference points to appreciate how high the state’s burden 
actually is. 
This approach is rooted in a psychological principle called 
“contrast effects,” and is now supported by empirical evidence as 
well. In this Article, I present the results of my controlled 
experiment where mock jurors read the identical case summary of 
a criminal trial and were then randomly assigned to two groups, 
each of which received a different reasonable doubt instruction. The 
group that received the relative, context-based instruction acquitted 
 
 *  J.D., summa cum laude, Marquette University Law School (1999); 
C.P.A., University of Illinois Board of Examiners (1997); M.B.A., Marquette 
University Graduate School (1994); B.S., University of Wisconsin—Parkside 
(1990). I am a criminal defense attorney and author; I have published four books 
and twenty law review articles on criminal law and procedure. Many thanks to 
Lawrence T. White, Ph.D., for his assistance with data collection and his valuable 
comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Thanks to Peter White for his 
assistance with MTurk programming. 
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at a rate 30 percent higher than the group that received a simple, 
undefined instruction. This result was significant at p < .05. 
Further, participants that received this relative, context-based 
instruction required a higher subjective confidence level in the 
defendant’s guilt before they were willing to convict. 
Drawing on this and other behavioral research, this Article 
presents a comprehensive jury instruction on the presumption of 
innocence and burden of proof that is designed to fulfill the 
Constitution’s promise: to ensure that defendants remain free of 
conviction “except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
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The Constitution protects a criminal defendant from 
conviction unless the state can prove his or her guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.1 The problem, however, is that this burden of 
proof is only as formidable as the words used to describe it to the 
jury. 
When instructing juries on reasonable doubt, many courts go 
to great lengths to explain the concept. Unfortunately, these 
definitions often do more harm than good. Some definitions create 
confusion; others actually diminish the state’s burden of proof 
below the constitutionally mandated standard; and yet others are 
so flawed they actually shift the burden to the defendant.2 
Given these risks, other courts have decided that reasonable 
doubt should not be explained at all, as there is no better way to 
describe the concept than the two words themselves. However, a 
wealth of empirical research demonstrates that reasonable doubt 
is not self-defining.3 That is, when left unexplained, the reasonable 
doubt standard offers no greater protection against conviction than 
the preponderance of evidence standard or the clear and 
convincing evidence standard.4 
How, then, should courts explain the criminal burden of proof 
to jurors? This Article advocates for a relative, context-based 
approach to instructing jurors on reasonable doubt. In other words, 
to provide the jury with necessary points of reference to appreciate 
how high this burden of proof actually is, the reasonable doubt 
 
 1.  See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (guaranteeing the right to due process); 
infra Part II. 
 2.  Infra Part II.A. 
 3.  See Federico Picinali, The Threshold Lies in the Method: Instructing 
Jurors About Reasoning Beyond Reasonable Doubt, 19 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 
139, 140 (2015) (discussing the results of various studies about how jurors apply 
a given standard without a concrete definition). 
 4.  Infra Part II.B. 
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standard should be explained on a relative basis by comparing and 
contrasting it with the two lower, civil burdens of proof.5 
This approach is rooted in the psychological principle called 
“contrast effects,”6 and is now supported by empirical evidence as 
well.7 In this Article, I present the results of my controlled 
experiment where 379 mock jurors read the same case summary of 
a hypothetical criminal trial.8 Participants were then randomly 
assigned to two groups, each of which received a different 
reasonable doubt instruction: Group A (N=181) received an 
instruction that left reasonable doubt unexplained; Group B 
(N=198) received an instruction that explained the concept on a 
relative basis, within the context of the two lower, civil burdens of 
proof.9  
Group A, which received the undefined instruction, acquitted 
the defendant at the rate of 32.6 percent; Group B, which received 
the relative, context-based instruction, acquitted the defendant at 
the higher rate of 42.4 percent.10 This was a 30 percent increase in 
the acquittal rate and was statistically significant at p < .05, with 
an exact p-value of 0.0496.11 Further, participants in Group B also 
required a higher subjective confidence level in the defendant’s 
guilt before they were willing to convict.12 
Given these findings, there is now strong empirical evidence 
to support the use of a relative, context-based approach to 
instructing jurors on reasonable doubt. Drawing on this study and 
on other empirical research, this Article presents a comprehensive 
jury instruction on the presumption of innocence and burden of 
proof for use in criminal trials.13 The instruction is designed to 
fulfill the Constitution’s guarantee that defendants will not be 
convicted of a crime unless the state proves guilt beyond a 
 
 5.  Infra Part III.  
 6. Contrast Effects, PSYCH.: PSYCH. RES. & REFERENCE, 
https://perma.cc/LPA6-SU76 (last visited Sept. 5, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 7. Infra Part IV. 
 8.  Infra Part IV.C.   
 9.  Infra Part IV.D.  
 10.  Infra Part IV.E.  
 11.  Infra Part IV.E.  
 12.  Infra Part IV.E.  
 13.  Infra Part V.   
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reasonable doubt.14 This Article also addresses some study 
limitations as well as potential criticisms, and offers 
methodological suggestions for future researchers.15 
II. Due Process and Reasonable Doubt 
The Supreme Court held that, in criminal trials, “the Due 
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .”16 This high burden is 
designed to protect us “from dubious and unjust convictions, with 
resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property.”17 Further, 
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt is “indispensable to 
command the respect and confidence of the community in 
applications of the criminal law.”18 Despite such grand language, 
this theoretical protection is only as strong as the trial judge’s 
burden of proof instruction to the jury. 
Trial courts are largely left to their own devices when 
instructing jurors on reasonable doubt.19 In the process, two 
divergent philosophies have emerged. In one camp, many courts 
believe “that a jury must be given some assistance in 
understanding the concept.”20 This is the majority view, as most 
 
 14.  See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (granting citizens the right of due 
process in criminal trials and extending those rights to state proceedings); In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (discussing the burden of proof and due 
process); infra Part V.  
 15.  Infra Part VI.   
 16.  Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. For the origins of our criminal burden of proof, 
see generally Miller W. Shealy, Jr., A Reasonable Doubt About “Reasonable 
Doubt”, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 225 (2013); Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of 
Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of Proof Have Weakened the 
Presumption of Innocence, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1165 (2003).  
 17.  Winship, 397 U.S. at 362 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 
160, 174 (1949)). 
 18.  Id. at 364. 
 19.  See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5–6  (1994) (giving courts 
tremendous leeway when instructing jurors on proof beyond a reasonable doubt); 
Shealy, supra note 16, at 229 (“[T]he Supreme Court has inexcusably failed to 
give definition or substance to this concept, which it regards as fundamental to 
our system of justice.”).  
 20.  State v. Aubert, 421 A.2d 124, 127 (N.H. 1980). 
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states attempt to define or explain reasonable doubt in some 
fashion.21 In the other camp, several courts refuse to define or 
explain reasonable doubt, claiming that attempts at “elucidation 
tend[] to misleading refinements.”22 This is the view of a 
substantial minority, including several federal23 and state 
jurisdictions.24  
Which view is correct? The answer is both. It is true that many 
attempts to explain reasonable doubt have resulted in “misleading 
refinements”25 or, worse yet, have lowered the government’s 
burden of proof or even shifted it to the defendant. However, it is 
also clear that juries “must be given some assistance in 
understanding the concept.”26 When reasonable doubt is left 
unexplained, jurors fail to distinguish between it and the two 
lower, civil burdens of proof.27 In other words, as Parts II.A and 
II.B demonstrate, both approaches to instructing jurors on 
reasonable doubt have failed to fulfill the Constitution’s grand 
promise. 
 
 21. See Bobby Greene, Reasonable Doubt: Is It Defined by Whatever Is at the 
Top of the Google Page?, 50 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 933, 941 (2017) (stating that in 
thirty-nine states, instruction committees or courts make some attempt to explain 
the concept in their jury instructions); infra Part II.A.  
 22.  United States v. Lawson, 507 F.2d 433, 443 (7th Cir. 1974), overruled on 
other grounds by United States v. Hollinger, 553 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 23.  See, e.g., id.; United States v. Vavlitis, 9 F.3d 206, 212 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(attempting to define the term “is unnecessary, could confuse the jury, and 
provides fertile grounds for objections”); United States v. Headspeth, 852 F.2d 
753, 755 (4th Cir. 1988) (“We have frequently admonished district courts not to 
attempt to define reasonable doubt in their instructions to the jury . . . .”), 
abrogated on other grounds by Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).  
 24.  See, e.g., ILL. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 2.03 (2017), 
https://perma.cc/VAH4-6FRA (PDF) (providing no definition for the term 
reasonable doubt). This instruction is based on a long line of Illinois cases holding 
that “neither the trial court nor counsel should define reasonable doubt for the 
jury.” People v. Downs, 69 N.E.3d 784, 788 (Ill. 2015). Several other states, 
including Texas, also leave the term unexplained. See Greene, supra note 21, at 
941 n.44 (naming ten states, in addition to Illinois, that do not define the term). 
 25.  See Lawson, 507 F.2d at 443 (highlighting the difficulties courts face in 
providing the jury with the appropriate means of determining reasonable doubt). 
 26.  Aubert, 421 A.2d at 127. 
 27.  Infra Part V. 
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A. Misleading Refinements 
Many attempts to explain reasonable doubt to the jury have 
actually lowered the government’s burden of proof or even shifted 
it to the defendant; five such examples are discussed below. 
1. An Alternative Hypothesis 
When explaining reasonable doubt, many courts include an 
alternative-hypothesis clause in their jury instruction.28 This 
clause instructs jurors that “if two conclusions can reasonably be 
drawn from the evidence, one of innocence and one of guilt, you 
must adopt the one of innocence.”29 
The problem with this language—and with similarly worded 
versions of the alternative-hypothesis clause—is it “suggests that 
a preponderance of the evidence standard is relevant, when it is 
not.”30 That is, from a jury’s perspective, “if conviction of a crime 
fits the facts better than acquittal, it is extremely difficult to 
overcome the desire to match the facts with the better of the two 
models, even if the [state’s] case is not very strong.”31 
Even worse than lowering the state’s burden of proof, this 
clause puts the spotlight “on the defendant’s ability to produce 
alternatives to the government’s case, and thereby shift[s] the 
 
 28.  See, e.g., United States v. Gibson, 726 F.2d 869, 874 (1st Cir. 1984) 
(holding that the inclusion of the alternative-hypothesis clause did not render the 
instruction insufficient), cert. denied 466 U.S. 960 (1984); United States v. 
Richardson, 562 F.2d 476, 482 (7th Cir. 1977) (stating that the 
alternative-hypothesis instruction should be employed when a case “involves 
solely circumstantial evidence”), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1072 (1978); People v. 
Magana, 267 Cal. Rptr. 414, 416–17 (Ct. App. 1990) (discussing the 
alternative-hypothesis in the context of a reasonable doubt instruction).  
 29.  State v. Griffin, 749 A.2d 1192, 1197 (Conn. 2000). After 2000, 
Connecticut changed its jury instructions to include an awkward and difficult to 
understand, but technically superior, wording: “Proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
is proof that precludes every reasonable hypothesis except guilt and is 
inconsistent with any other rational conclusion.” CONN. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
NO. 2.2-3 (2017), https://perma.cc/5HJJ-PCVF (PDF).  
 30.  United States v. Khan, 821 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 31.  Lawrence Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: 
Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105, 108–09 (1999). 
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burden of proof to the defendant.”32 Ironically, this type of jury 
instruction is especially harmful to an innocent defendant who 
“knows nothing about the crime,”33 and is therefore unable to 
produce an alternative hypothesis for the jury’s consideration.34 
2. Searching for Truth 
In some jury instructions on the burden of proof beyond 
reasonable doubt, courts have strangely described the jury’s duty 
as a “search for truth,”35 or something similar.36 Although 
misplaced, this mandate seems innocent enough at first. After all, 
in a hypothetical world where all relevant facts are known and are 
presented to the jury, we would want verdicts to reflect the truth 
of what happened.37 But in reality, there are numerous barriers 
that prevent defendants from obtaining relevant evidence;38 even 
 
 32.  Id. at 105. 
 33.  Id. at 108. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Commonwealth v. Allard, 711 N.E.2d 156, 159 (Mass. 1999). Other 
states have affirmed almost the exact wording in the same context. See, e.g., 
People v. Walos, 645 N.Y.S.2d 695, 695 (App. Div. 1996) (using “search for the 
truth” language); State v. Needs, 508 S.E.2d 857, 866 (S.C. 1998) (utilizing “in 
search of the truth” language).  
 36.  See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 958 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1992) (“[F]ind 
the truth.”); United States v. Pine, 609 F.2d 106, 108 (3d Cir. 1979) (“[E]volve the 
truth.”); State v. Dunkel, 466 N.W.2d 425, 429–30 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) 
(“Determine what you think the truth of the matter is and act accordingly.”); State 
v. Marshall, 586 A.2d 85, 154 (N.J. 1991) (“[L]et your verdict declare the truth.”).  
 37.  Even this tempered truth-related claim is overly simplistic, as it ignores 
at least two things. First, in some trials the facts are undisputed, and the jury’s 
sole duty is to determine whether what happened creates a certain level of 
risk — for example, whether it “tends to cause or provoke a disturbance.” WIS. 
STAT. § 947.01 (2018) (emphasis added). In such cases, there is no truth to find; 
rather, the jury must render an opinion on a theoretical, even hypothetical, 
inquiry. Second, the mandate to search for truth also ignores the jury’s power of 
nullification—an increasingly important concept given today’s 
over-criminalization of behavior. In Wisconsin, for example, a person’s second or 
subsequent simple possession of even a small amount of marijuana is a felony. 
WIS. STAT. § 939.62 (2018). In this type of case, jurors may not want their verdict 
to reflect the truth of what really happened, and may instead wish to exercise 
their power of nullification.  
 38.  See Keith A. Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions: Rethinking the Search 
for the Truth, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 912, 914 (2011) (“[O]nly one side—the 
State— has access to all of the crime scene evidence and all of the government’s 
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when they do, legislatures and courts have developed numerous 
trial rules to prevent them from ever presenting such evidence to 
a jury.39 Therefore, describing trials as a search for truth is, at best, 
naïve and, at worst, disingenuous. 
More accurately, given the real world in which we must 
operate, “truth is not the jury’s job.”40 Instead, “[t]he question for 
any jury is whether the burden of proof has been carried by the 
party who bears it. In a criminal case . . . [t]he jury cannot discern 
whether that has occurred without examining the evidence for 
reasonable doubt.”41 But when a court instructs jurors to search for 
the truth, it “suggests determining whose version of events is more 
likely true, the government’s or the defendant’s, and thereby 
intimates a preponderance of evidence standard.”42 
Worse, some courts explicitly pit this search for the truth 
against the jury’s duty to examine the state’s case for reasonable 
doubt. One state, for example, concludes its pattern instruction by 
telling jurors: “You are not to search for doubt. You are to search 
for the truth.”43 This mandate “impermissibly portray[s] the 
 
resources to collect the evidence. Typically, the accused has few resources to 
permit a serious independent investigation.”). 
 39.  See, e.g., State v. Carter, 782 N.W.2d 695, 716–17 n.6 (Wis. 2010) 
(Bradley, J., concurring) (stating that a child accuser’s prior sexual conduct is not 
admissible, even though “the prosecutor repeatedly emphasized [the child 
accuser’s] detailed sexual knowledge as proof of [the defendant’s] guilt”); cf. State 
v. Colburn, 366 P.3d 258, 262 (Mont. 2016) (stating that an accuser’s prior sexual 
contacts may be relevant to show an alternative source of sexual knowledge). 
 40.  State v. Berube, 286 P.3d 402, 411 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). 
 41.  Id.  
 42.  United States v. Gonzalez-Balderas, 11 F.3d 1218, 1223 (5th Cir. 1994), 
cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1129 (1994); see also United States v. Pine, 609 F.2d 106, 
108 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating that the First and Fifth Circuits disprove of such jury 
instructions because the truth language “tend[s] to dilute and thereby impair the 
constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt”); United States v. 
Harper, 662 F.3d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[Defendant] assert[ing] that the ‘truth’ 
language might have been misunderstood by the jurors as an invitation to convict 
by a mere preponderance of the evidence.”), cert. denied, 567 U.S. 942 (2012); 
State v. Avila, 532 N.W.2d 423, 429 (Wis. 1995) (“[Defendant] maintain[ing] 
that . . . th[e truth] language . . . would be reasonably likely to impose a lesser 
burden than reasonable doubt upon the State.”), reh’g denied, 535 N.W.2d 440 
(1995). 
 43.  WIS. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 140 (2018) (emphasis added). 
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reasonable doubt standard as a defense tool for hiding the truth,”44 
and completely eviscerates the state’s burden.45 
3. More Than a Feeling 
In another example of misleading refinements, some courts 
explain the concept of reasonable doubt to their juries by 
distinguishing it from other things; for example, one court 
concluded its burden of proof instruction this way: “So to 
summarize . . . , you may not find the defendant guilty based on a 
mere suspicion of guilt.”46  
The danger of this comparison is easily demonstrated through 
an analogy. Describing proof beyond a reasonable doubt as being 
greater than a mere suspicion of guilt is like describing Roger 
Federer’s tennis game as being better than mine. The claim is 
technically true, as Federer is better at tennis than I am. However, 
the comparison does nothing to explain how good he really is, and, 
worse, it is grossly misleading. Why? Because it implies that 
Federer might be only marginally better than a minimally-trained 
weekend tennis hack.47  
Similarly, telling a jury that proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
is greater than a mere suspicion of guilt is technically true; 
however, it does nothing to explain how strong the state’s evidence 
 
 44.  Berube, 286 P.3d at 411 (emphasis added); see also Avila, 532 N.W.2d at 
429 (“[Defendant] argues . . . that finding doubt would mean not finding the 
truth.”). 
 45.  See generally Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, Truth or Doubt? 
An Empirical Test of Criminal Jury Instructions, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1139 (2016); 
Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, Testing the Impact of Criminal Jury 
Instructions on Verdicts: A Conceptual Replication, 117 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 22 
(2017). This evisceration of the burden of proof has been empirically 
demonstrated. However, in Wisconsin, the state’s high court rejected the 
behavioral research—and even attacked its own previous decisions that relied on 
behavioral research in other contexts—to uphold the constitutionality of the 
state’s “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” instruction that actually tells jurors “not 
to search for doubt.” State v. Trammell, 928 N.W.2d 564, 583 (Wis. 2019).  
 46.  Commonwealth v. Ragan, 743 A.2d 390, 401 (Pa. 1999). 
 47.  Michael D. Cicchini, Roger Federer, Michael Cicchini, and 
Pennsylvania’s Burden of Proof, LEGAL WATCHDOG (June 17, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/4M5R-Y7PP (last visited Sept. 5, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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must be to win a conviction.48 The comparison is grossly 
misleading, as it implies that anything marginally stronger than a 
mere suspicion might be sufficient to convict. This would include 
clear and convincing evidence, a preponderance of evidence, and 
even a reasonable suspicion of guilt. Of course, these levels of proof 
fall short—and in some cases well short—of what is required.49 
4. The Important Affairs of Life 
The variety of ways courts have dreamed up to mislead jurors 
is seemingly limitless. Another example is the 
important-affairs-of-life analogy. Some courts— subtly shifting the 
inquiry from whether the state presented proof beyond reasonable 
doubt to whether the defendant raised reasonable doubt—instruct 
their jurors that “[a] reasonable doubt is a doubt that would cause 
a reasonably careful and sensible person to hesitate before acting 
upon a matter of importance in his or her own affairs.”50 
Given a strict reading, this language appears pro-defendant. 
For example, consider the purchase of a home, something that is 
surely a “matter of importance” for nearly every juror. If a doubt 
merely caused the juror to “hesitate before acting,” it would be a 
reasonable doubt even if the juror ultimately moved forward with 
the purchase. However, empirical studies demonstrate that jurors 
do not interpret the language in such a literal way.51 Rather, the 
“decisions we make in the most important affairs of our 
 
 48.  See id. (illustrating the problems with such reasonable doubt 
instructions). 
 49.  See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (stating that civil burdens 
of proof are not constitutionally sufficient to support a criminal conviction). 
 50.  PA. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 7.01 (2016). 
 51.  See Mandeep K. Dhami et al., Instructions on Reasonable Doubt: 
Defining the Standard of Proof and the Juror’s Task, 21 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
169, 175 (2015) (“[B]y reducing the standard of proof below that intended by the 
law, the ‘doubt-hesitate’ instruction is more likely to lead to false convictions.”). 
In the real world of criminal trials, however, defense counsel can use the 
important-affairs-of- life analogy to the defendant’s advantage by stressing that 
the doubt need only cause a juror to “hesitate before acting” in order to be a 
reasonable one. In other words, it doesn’t matter that the juror would ultimately 
act; rather, the issue is whether the juror would merely hesitate before doing so. 
Id. at 171.  
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lives — choosing a spouse, a job, a place to live, and the 
like — generally involve a heavy element of uncertainty and 
risk-taking. They are wholly unlike the decisions jurors ought to 
make in criminal cases.”52 
As another example, choosing a spouse is probably the most 
important of all our decisions. Yet even that analogy is defective, 
as “the decision to marry is often based on a standard far less than 
reasonable doubt, as reflected in statistics indicating 33–60% of all 
marriages end in divorce.”53 This demonstrates that “[t]he 
judgment of a reasonable [person] in the ordinary affairs of life, 
however important, is influenced and controlled by the 
preponderance of evidence.”54 This, once again, is far less than 
what the Constitution requires in order to convict a defendant of a 
crime.55  
5. Unreasonable Doubts 
As a final illustration of misleading refinements, when 
attempting to explain the concept of reasonable doubt to their 
juries some courts take the inverse approach: they go to great 
lengths to enumerate the kinds of doubt that are not reasonable.56 
This language also shifts the jury’s focus to what the defendant, 
rather than the state, must establish. Such an instruction strongly 
deters acquittals. 
For example, many modern instructions warn jurors that “[a] 
doubt which arises merely from sympathy or from fear to return a 
 
 52.  FED. JUD. CTR. PATTERN CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 21 (1987), 
https://perma.cc/HP9A-UW9W (PDF); see also United States v. Jaramillo-Suarez, 
950 F.2d 1378, 1386 (9th Cir. 1991) (criticizing the “important-affairs-of-life” 
analogy). 
 53.  People v. Nguyen, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 840, 845 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing Dyer, 
The Divorce Rate Isn’t What You Think, DALL. MORNING NEWS, May 6, 1995, at 
3C; Kasper, Marriage Is Rougher Second Time Around, KAN. CITY STAR, Sept. 18, 
1995, at E5; Epstein, Automation, E-Mail Encourage Isolation, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 
14, 1995, at A1). 
 54.  Id. at 845 (quoting People v. Brannon, 47 Cal. 96, 97 (1873)). 
 55.  See U.S. CONST. amends. V,  XIV (providing the constitutional basis for 
what is required in a criminal trial).  
 56.  See, e.g., FLA. STD. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 3.7 (2019) (explaining that 
“[a] reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt, a speculative, imaginary or 
forced doubt”).  
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verdict of guilt is not a reasonable doubt.”57 This is a contemporary 
adaptation of an older instruction that outright challenged jurors 
to convict, warning them not to be a “weak-kneed, timid, jellyfish 
of a juror who is seeking to avoid the performance of a disagreeable 
duty.”58 Similarly, other instructions warn jurors that “[a] 
reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt, a speculative, 
imaginary or forced doubt.”59 This language is obviously 
inaccurate: “Doubting, after all, is a matter of speculation and 
imagination. It requires one to imagine alternative models 
consistent with the evidence.”60 
The underlying problem with all of these unreasonable doubt 
warnings is that “[t]he weight of the instruction conveys a message 
to the jurors: [t]he judge would not have presented so many ways 
in which the juror’s doubts can be used improperly if this were not 
the main problem to avoid.”61 This clear message from the bench 
minimizes the jury’s constitutional obligation to acquit, absent 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and greatly increases the 
government’s odds of winning a conviction by a lower standard of 
proof. 
B. Reasonable Doubt is Not Self-Defining 
With so many pitfalls awaiting the trial judge who attempts to 
define or explain reasonable doubt, many courts have determined 
 
 57.  WIS. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 140 (emphasis added). One problem 
with this warning is that it paints only half of the picture, i.e., it neglects to warn 
the jury that it should not convict out of sympathy for the alleged victim or fear 
of rendering a not guilty verdict. Some prosecutors are quick to take advantage of 
this oversight by playing on jurors’ sympathies and fears. See, e.g., Rhodes v. 
State, 547 So. 2d 1201, 1206 (Fla. 1989) (attempting to invoke sympathy, the 
prosecutor urged the jury to “show [the defendant] the same mercy shown to the 
victim on the day of her death”); N. Mar. I. v. Mendiola, 976 F.2d 475, 486 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (attempting to invoke fear, the prosecutor warned the jury “that gun is 
still out there . . . . If you say not guilty, [the defendant] walks out right out the 
door, right behind you”), overruled by George v. Camacho, 119 F.3d 1393 (9th Cir. 
1997). 
 58.  People v. Feldman, 71 N.E.2d 433, 443 (N.Y. 1947). 
 59.  FLA. STD. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 3.7 (2019) (emphasis added). 
 60.  Solan, supra note 31, at 143 (emphasis added).  
 61.  Id. at 144.  
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“that the better practice is not to attempt the definition.”62 Their 
justification is this: reasonable doubt is already “self-defining,” 
and, therefore, jurors require no further explanation to understand 
it.63 However, this assumption has now been thoroughly tested and 
debunked. 
1. What’s in a Name? 
Several studies have tested whether there is something 
inherently  descriptive in the words “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
that makes the label self-explanatory.64 For example, in a state 
that leaves the concept unexplained, real- life jurors were surveyed 
after their jury service was concluded.65 Quite incorrectly, nearly 
one-third of respondents “were either very sure or pretty sure”66 
that “once the state has come forward with evidence of a 
defendant’s guilt, it becomes the defendant’s responsibility to 
persuade the jury of his innocence.”67 
Similarly, in the laboratory “a series of empirical 
studies . . . has shown that in the absence of a definition of [beyond 
a reasonable doubt] mock jurors find it hard to apply the 
standard . . . .”68 These empirical studies, or controlled 
experiments, essentially follow the same general format. To test 
the effect of jury instructions on verdicts, researchers recruit test 
 
 62.  United States v. Lawson, 507 F.2d 433, 443 (7th Cir. 1974), overruled by 
United States v. Hollinger, 553 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1977); see also United States v. 
Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[A]t best, definitions of reasonable 
doubt are unhelpful to a jury, and, at worst, they have the potential to impair a 
defendant’s constitutional right to have the government prove each element 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 63.  Lawson, 507 F.2d at 443; see also supra notes 21–24 and accompanying 
text (detailing other examples of federal jurisdictions and other states that leave 
the concept largely undefined). 
 64.  See Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1881) (concluding the 
lower court committed no error in instructing the jury on needing to have proof 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” to find the defendant guilty in one of the earliest 
cases to record using the phrase). 
 65.  See Solan, supra note 31, at 119 (discussing Bradley Saxton, How Well 
Do Jurors Understand Jury Instructions? A Field Test Using Real Juries and Real 
Trials in Wyoming, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 59 (1998)).  
 66.  Id. at 120.  
 67.  Id. at 119. 
 68.  Picinali, supra note 3.  
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participants to serve as mock jurors in hypothetical criminal cases. 
Sometimes the case is presented to participants in video form, 
sometimes through actors who read portions of a transcript from a 
real-life trial, and other times through case summary materials 
which the participants read themselves. 
After watching, listening to, or reading the identical case, 
mock jurors are then randomly assigned to different groups, each 
of which receives a different instruction on the burden of proof they 
should apply. One group receives a preponderance of evidence 
instruction (the lowest burden), another receives a clear and 
convincing evidence instruction (an intermediate burden), and 
another receives a reasonable doubt instruction (the highest 
burden). With all conditions being held constant across test 
groups—except, of course, the burden of proof instruction—mock 
jurors are then asked to render a verdict. Researchers then 
compare the groups’ verdicts to see if the reasonable doubt 
instruction provided the defendant with greater protection against 
conviction, i.e., a higher acquittal rate.  
These controlled experiments have the advantage of isolating 
the effect of a single variable—the burden of proof jury 
instruction—on verdicts. Additionally, the experiments have 
consistently demonstrated that reasonable doubt is not 
self-defining.69 That is, when one group receives a simple 
reasonable doubt instruction that leaves the concept largely 
unexplained, there are no significant differences in conviction 
rates between groups. In some cases, the lower burdens of proof 
even offer defendants more protection from conviction than does 
the undefined, or minimally defined, reasonable doubt standard. 
For example, in a 1973 study, mock jurors heard one of two 
cases: rape or theft.70 They were then instructed on one of the three 
different burdens of proof.71 In the theft case, the different burdens 
 
 69.  See id. at 140 n.6 (citing multiple empirical studies that demonstrate 
that juries select different probabilities when applying the “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” standard when not provided a definition). 
 70.  W.R. Cornish & A.P. Sealy, Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 CRIM. 
L. REV. 208, 210–11 (1973).  
 71.  Id. at 212–14. The study also tested two slightly different versions of a 
reasonable doubt instruction, each offering only a minimal explanation of the 
concept. The first version described reasonable doubt as “a doubt that might affect 
1458 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1443 (2019) 
of proof did not produce statistically significant differences in 
verdicts.72 In the rape case, the difference between groups was 
statistically significant.73 However, the verdicts did not order 
themselves properly: mock jurors who received the reasonable 
doubt instruction acquitted at a lower rate than those who were 
instructed to apply the clear and convincing evidence standard.74 
Likewise, a 1985 study published the results of three 
experiments, two of which are discussed here.75 In the first 
experiment, mock jurors read the same fact pattern based on a civil 
trial and were then assigned to groups, each of which was 
instructed on a different burden of proof.76 Despite the three 
different burdens, there were no statistically significant 
differences in group conviction rates.77 The second experiment—a 
replication of the first—produced the same null effect.78 That is, 
 
you in daily business or domestic decisions,” which is superficially similar to the 
important-affairs-of-life analogy discussed in Part II.A.4. However, the words 
“might affect you” are vague and, if anything, may even strengthen the 
instruction. The second version described reasonable doubt as “a doubt for which 
reasons can be given.”  Merely requiring that “reasons . . . be given” for the doubt 
to be a reasonable one offers little elucidation and, if anything, seems to broaden 
the category of reasonable doubts, thus strengthening the instruction. These 
instructions were brief, totaling only thirty-two and thirty-five words 
respectively. By comparison, many of today’s reasonable doubt instructions that 
attempt to define or explain the concept run well into the hundreds of words. Infra 
Part V. In short, these minimalist explanations failed to provide the defendant 
with any protection beyond the lower, civil burdens of proof. 
 72.  See id. at 219 (“In the [t]heft case the results show a trend . . . but it is 
not sufficiently great to have any statistical significance—it could be the result of 
mere chance.”). 
 73.  See id. (“The final verdicts against both defendants vary in a manner 
that has statistical significance.”). 
 74.  Id. This study labeled the intermediate burden of proof as “sure and 
certain” rather than “clear and convincing.” Id. The researchers concluded, with 
regard to the rape case, that the instruction “to be ‘sure and certain’ will cause 
[participants] to require a higher degree of proof than is the case with either of 
the other [instructions] tested.” Id.  
 75.  Dorothy K. Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal v. Quantified 
Definitions of Standards of Proof, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 159 (1985). 
 76.  Id. at 162–63. fe 
 77. See id. at 164 (“For the legal definitions, the multivariate effect of 
standard of proof was not significant, approximately F (12, 158) < 1, indicating 
that the legal definitions of the standards of proof had no effect on the dependent 
variables . . . .”). 
 78.  See id. at 169 (“The major findings of Experiment 1 were replicated.”). 
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the instruction on reasonable doubt did not offer defendants 
significantly greater protection against conviction than did the two 
lower, civil burdens of proof.79  
Similarly, a 1991 study published the results of two additional 
experiments.80 In the first experiment, mock jurors watched a 
video reenactment of a murder trial involving an insanity 
defense.81 They were then assigned to groups which received 
instructions on the different burdens of proof.82 Despite the 
different burdens, there were no statistically significant 
differences in group conviction rates.83 The second experiment—a 
replication study84—again produced the same null effect.85 In other 
words, the reasonable doubt instruction was not shown to offer the 
defendant greater protection against conviction.  
Finally, in a 2019 study, mock jurors read one of four criminal 
cases: battery with weak evidence of guilt; battery with strong 
evidence; trespass with weak evidence; and trespass with strong 
evidence.86 Participants were assigned to one of three groups, each 
of which was instructed to apply a different burden of proof.87 Once 
 
 79.  See id. at 164 (explaining the outcome of the second experiment 
conducted in the study). The first study tested a reasonable doubt instruction that 
included very little elaboration and totaled only seventy-nine words. It described 
being convinced beyond a reasonable doubt as feeling “an abiding conviction, to a 
moral certainty . . . .” Id. at 163. The second experiment, similar to the first 
experiment, demonstrated that such minimal guidance was insufficient to convey 
the concept, as it did not provide the defendant with significant protection beyond 
the lower, civil burdens of proof. Id. at 169.  
 80.  James R. P. Ogloff, A Comparison of Insanity Defense Standards on 
Juror Decision Making, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 509 (1991).  
 81. See id. at 514 (“The videotaped reenactment was based on an actual trial 
from Michigan. In the case, the defendant, a fundamentalist Christian, killed his 
daughter and three of her friends.”).  
 82.  See id. at 515 (“The instructions and questionnaires only varied to the 
extent that the participants were assigned to conditions that varied the insanity 
standard . . . burden of proof . . . and standard of evidence.”). 
 83. Id. at 516.   
 84. See id. at 518 (“The videotaped trial used in Experiment 1 was used in 
Experiment 2. Participants were given the same jury instructions as in 
Experiment 1.”).  
 85. Id. at 519. 
 86.  Lawrence T. White & Michael D. Cicchini, Is Reasonable Doubt 
Self-Defining?, 64 VILL. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2019).  
 87. See id. at 11–12 (detailing that one group was assigned a preponderance 
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again—and regardless of the case type (battery or trespass) and 
strength of evidence (weak or strong)—the three different burdens 
of proof did not produce significantly different verdict patterns.88 
In fact, similar to the findings of the 1973 study,89 the verdicts did 
not even order themselves properly: mock jurors who received the 
undefined reasonable doubt instruction acquitted the defendant at 
a lower (but statistically insignificant) rate than those who were 
instructed to apply the mere preponderance of evidence standard.90 
2. The 60/65 Rule 
In addition to the above studies showing no significant 
differences in acquittal rates under the three burdens of proof, 
researchers have also been testing the impact of reasonable doubt 
jury instructions in a different way: they seek to determine the 
subjective confidence level that jurors require before they are 
willing to convict.91 “This research has consistently shown that the 
 
of the evidence standard, the second a clear and convincing evidence standard, 
and the third a beyond a reasonable doubt standard). In addition to testing three 
different burdens of proof, the study also tested three different instructions on the 
reasonable doubt standard. One instruction left the concept completely 
unexplained; a second merely equated being convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
with having “a firm belief” in the defendant’s guilt; and a third merely told jurors 
that, if they had a reasonable doubt, they should acquit “even if you think that 
the charge is probably true.” Id. The three reasonable doubt instructions, which 
totaled fifty, sixty-three, and sixty words respectively, did not produce 
significantly different verdict patterns and therefore were combined into a single 
reasonable doubt group. Id. at 11 n.74.  
 88. See id. at 13 (“In plain language, the different standard of 
proof— [preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing, and beyond a 
reasonable doubt]—did not produce different verdict patterns.”).   
 89. Cornish & Sealy, supra note 70, at 210.  
 90. See White & Cicchini, supra note 86, at 13  
Mock jurors who received a [beyond a reasonable doubt] 
instruction . . . voted to convict at the rate of 43.6%; those who received 
a [clear and convincing evidence] instruction . . . voted to convict at the 
nearly identical rate of 43.0%; and those who received a 
[preponderance of the evidence] instruction . . . voted to convict at the 
somewhat lower rate of 37.4%. 
 91. Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the 
Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 88 (2002) (citing HARRY KALVEN, 
JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966)).  
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jurors in criminal cases will often be satisfied with much less 
certainty than is conventionally assumed.”92  
When judges and others trained in the law are asked to equate 
the “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” standard with a 
corresponding confidence level in the defendant’s guilt, most reply 
that it should be somewhere near 90 percent.93 In fact, in a large 
survey of federal judges that produced 171 respondents, 74 percent 
(or 126 judges) set the corresponding number at “90 percent or 
higher.”94 Similarly, in a real-life example, the Supreme Court of 
Nevada reversed a conviction because the trial judge, when 
instructing the jury, had equated proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
with “anything more than a 75% chance” that the defendant was 
guilty.95 On appeal, the court held that setting such a low 
threshold, coupled with another mistake, “constituted prejudicial 
error.”96  
Contrary to the beliefs and desires of most judges, however, 
jurors equate our highest burden of proof with a much lower 
confidence level in guilt. In a 1996 study, when asked to quantify 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, test participants set an average 
threshold that ranged from a mere 54 percent to 70 percent, 
depending on the particular version of the reasonable doubt 
instruction they received.97 Similarly, in a 2007 study, test 
participants set the conviction threshold at a mere 63 percent 
chance that the defendant was guilty.98 And in 2014, researchers 
 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Solan, supra note 31, at 126.   
 94. Id.; see also Jon O. Newman, Quantifying the Standard of Proof Beyond 
a Reasonable Doubt: A Comment on Three Comments, 5 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 
267, 267 (2006) (discussing the subjective threshold set by a judge and several 
law professors as being “no less than 95%,” “more than a 95% chance,” and no less 
“than 0.8”) (citations omitted). 
 95.  See McCullough v. State, 657 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Nev. 1983) (reversing 
lower court’s decision partly on the grounds that the conception of “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” is “inherently qualitative”). 
 96.  Id.  
 97.  Irwin A. Horowitz & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, A Concept in Search of a 
Definition: The Effects of Reasonable Doubt Instructions on Certainty of Guilt 
Standards and Jury Verdicts, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 655, 666 (1996). 
 98.  See Daniel B. Wright & Melanie Hall, How a “Reasonable Doubt” 
Instruction Affects Decisions of Guilt, 29 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 91, 96 
(2007)  
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found that laypersons were willing to convict at a 68 percent 
probability of guilt.99 
The 2019 study discussed earlier also tested the threshold for 
conviction and found that 90 percent of mock jurors followed what 
the researchers called “the 60/65 rule.”100 That is, regardless of the 
burden of proof instruction they received, when participants 
believed that less than 60 percent of the evidence favored the state, 
they voted to acquit; but when they believed that more than 65 
percent of the evidence favored the state, they voted to convict.101 
Or, as another researcher put it, “[r]ather than having to move 
jurors from 0% to 90% certainty, all prosecutors need do is move 
the needle on the scale from 50% to perhaps 65% certainty.”102 
III. A Legal Theory of Relativity 
As demonstrated earlier, attempting to explain reasonable 
doubt to a jury is fraught with peril. Many attempts are a “grand 
conglomeration of garbled verbiage and verbal garbage.”103 Worse 
yet, many such attempts have actually diminished the burden of 
proof or even shifted it to the defendant.104 But on the other hand, 
the empirical evidence shows that when reasonable doubt is left 
undefined or is only minimally explained, the standard offers 
 
In this study, if someone given the additional instruction believed that 
there was about a 63% chance that the defendant was the culprit, they 
were as likely to give a guilty verdict as a not guilty verdict. Thus, for 
the instruction participants this was the level of reasonable doubt. 
 99.  See Svein Magnussen et al., The Probability of Guilt in Criminal Cases: 
Are People Aware of Being ‘Beyond Reasonable Doubt’?, 28 APPLIED COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOL. 196, 199 (2014) (“For police investigators, laypersons attending jury 
deliberations, and judges, the corresponding subjective probabilities were 61%, 
68%, and 83%, respectively.”).  
 100. See White & Cicchini, supra note 86, at 14 (“The tipping point—that is, 
the point at which the majority of participants, for the time, voted guilty instead 
of not guilty—occurred somewhere between 60% and 65%.”).   
 101. Id.   
 102. Irwin A. Horowitz, Reasonable Doubt Instructions: Commonsense Justice 
and Standard of Proof, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 285, 294 (1997). 
 103. State v. Aubert, 421 A.2d 124, 127 (N.H. 1980) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 104. Supra Part II.A. 
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defendants no greater protection than the two lower, civil burdens 
of proof.105 
The question, then, is this: How should courts explain the 
concept of reasonable doubt to accurately convey the heightened 
standard? At first blush, the answer might seem obvious. 
“Blackstone would have put the probability standard for proof 
‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ at somewhat more than 90%, for he 
declared: ‘It is better that ten guilty persons escape than one 
innocent suffer.’”106 Therefore, courts could simply instruct jurors 
that, in terms of confidence level, proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
means they must be 90 percent certain the defendant is guilty 
before they may convict.107 
This, however, is not a viable solution. As a practical matter, 
the numeric- based approach to defining proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is dead on arrival. Even though controlled experiments 
demonstrate that quantified definitions are effective and produce 
the desired, relative acquittal rates, “[t]he legal profession appears 
to be adverse to the expression of standards of proof in probability 
terms.”108 In other words, there is “no jurisdiction in which 
quantified definitions are given.”109 
But even if courts were willing to adopt a numeric-based 
definition, not everyone would agree about what number should be 
assigned to the reasonable doubt standard. It is well-settled that 
the preponderance of evidence standard means “any amount of 
 
 105. Supra Part II.B.  
 106.  United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 411 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (internal 
citation omitted). 
 107.  Instead of asking jurors to quantify their confidence level, another way 
of wording the question is to ask jurors to quantify the strength of the state’s 
evidence. Wording the question that way invokes the weight-of-evidence or 
scales-of-justice analogy. For example, one journalist used such an analogy in 
explaining the preponderance of evidence standard: “If . . . 50.1% of the evidence 
supports a claim but 49.9% does not, that 50.1% is still enough to tip the scale, to 
prove the claim.” Alan Abrahamson, Tragedy at Sea Pits What-Ifs Against Legal 
Proof: Law: Hopes of a Court Victory Fade for Family of Fisherman Who Died 
Near Naval Target Range, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 26, 1991, 12:00 AM), 
https://perma.cc/RX27-V37R (last visited Sep. 5, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 108.  Kagehiro & Stanton, supra note 75, at 174. 
 109.  Id.  
1464 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1443 (2019) 
certainty greater than 50%.”110 But what level of confidence is 
needed to be convinced of something beyond a reasonable doubt? 
“Is 90% certainty required? 95%? 99%? Or could the amount of 
certainty be much lower, say perhaps 75%?”111   
Rather than defining the criminal burden of proof on a 
numeric scale, then, the better approach is to explain the 
reasonable doubt standard on a relative basis by comparing it to 
the two lower, civil burdens of proof. 
As a preliminary matter, unlike attempts to assign a number 
to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the accuracy of the relative, 
context-based explanation is not open to debate. It is 
uncontroversial that the reasonable doubt standard is higher than 
the clear and convincing evidence standard which, in turn, is 
higher than the preponderance of evidence standard.112  
But the primary benefit of discussing the reasonable doubt 
standard on a relative basis is this: it gives the jury some necessary 
points of reference to understand how high the state’s burden of 
proof actually is. This relative approach is rooted in the 
psychological principle known as “contrast effects.”  
Most judgments in everyday life are evaluative in nature. 
People may want to know whether a particular grade is good or 
bad, whether a person is trustworthy, how well someone 
performed on a test, or what a person’s athletic abilities are like. 
Rarely can such questions be answered in absolute terms (e.g., 
running 1 mile in 5 minutes). Rather than absolute, judgments 
are usually relative and result from comparisons. That is, 
 
 110.  Lillquist, supra note 91, at 87. 
 111.  Id. The difficulty in answering this question is likely due to its 
theoretical economic underpinnings. That is, the number associated with proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is sometimes derived from the perceived disutility of 
convicting an innocent person compared with the perceived utility of convicting 
the guilty. These, of course, are matters that are the subject of considerable 
debate. However, such debate often leads to conclusions that are questionable or 
even highly suspicious. See id. at 91 (arguing that serious crimes such as 
“terrorism” should have a lower burden of proof due to the high cost of acquitting 
the guilty, but arguing that petty crimes such as “traffic offenses” should also 
have a lower burden of proof due to the low cost of convicting the innocent).   
 112. See, e.g., Fatico, 458 F. Supp. at 402–06 (discussing the different burdens 
of proof, their justifications, and the types of cases in which they are applied). Few 
things are uncontroversial in the legal arena, but there are countless legal 
authorities asserting the fundamental principle that proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is the highest burden of proof. This principle is to criminal law what offer 
and acceptance are to contract law.  
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judgments are mostly evaluations of a target with respect to 
some comparison standard. . . . [J]udgments may differ 
significantly depending on the comparison standard they are 
contrasted to, a phenomenon that social psychologists refer to 
as contrast effects.113 
We saw this principle in effect earlier when a jury instruction 
compared proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a mere suspicion of 
guilt.114 This approach was correct in principle, but absolutely 
horrible in its execution. Why? Because it utilized the defective 
comparison standard of mere suspicion, which is something that 
should not even be in the same discussion with proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Rather, in order to accurately convey its meaning and ensure 
that it provides defendants with more protection than the two civil 
burdens of proof, jurors must be instructed that proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is higher than a preponderance of evidence and 
higher than clear and convincing evidence. Providing the proper 
comparison standards may not guarantee that jurors will approach 
a 90 percent confidence level before they convict; however, 
providing these points of reference will likely mean the prosecutor 
will have to “move the needle on the scale” beyond a mere “65% 
certainty” to win a conviction.115  
Another benefit to this relative, context-based approach is its 
familiarity. It is not a completely foreign concept, as some courts 
already instruct their jurors this way. For example, one state’s 
instruction reads in relevant part: “In civil cases, it is only 
necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not or that 
its truth is highly probable. In criminal cases such as this, the 
State’s proof must be more powerful than that. It must be beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”116 Similarly, another state’s instruction reads 
in relevant part: “It is not enough . . . to establish a probability, 
even a strong probability, that the defendant is more likely to be 
guilty than not guilty. That is not enough.”117 
 
 113. Contrast Effects, supra note 6 (emphasis added). 
 114. Supra Part II.A.3. 
 115.  Horowitz, supra note 102, at 294.   
 116.  ARIZ. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 5(b)(1) (2016). 
 117.  MASS. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 2.180 (2015). 
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Some researchers have advocated for this relative, 
context-based approach to jury instructions. In a 2000 article, 
researchers argued that “[b]y providing this explicit contrast with 
a less stringent standard of proof [preponderance of evidence], the 
definition encourages jurors to adopt an appropriately high 
threshold for conviction.”118 Better still, the instruction “could be 
strengthened even further by adding an additional contrast with 
[the] clear and convincing” standard of proof.119 Similarly, in the 
2019 study previously discussed, the researchers argued: “In 
criminal cases, defining ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ by 
comparing it to other, lower standards would provide the necessary 
context for jurors to appreciate this high standard.”120 
There is even some empirical support for this relative, 
context-based approach to defining proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The 1985 study of two experiments, discussed earlier, 
actually included a third experiment. Participants read a set of 
jury instructions that included all three standards of proof, 
compared and contrasted the standards, and then rated each one 
for how difficult it would be for a plaintiff to win a civil case.121 The 
researchers concluded that this “third experiment suggested—but 
did not demonstrate—that the ineffectiveness of the legal 
definitions may be due to a lack of a comparative context; jury 
instructions may have to communicate the applicable standard’s 
ordinal position vis-à-vis the other standards of proof for improved 
understanding and utilization by jurors.”122 
In sum, a fundamental principle of psychology (“contrast 
effects”), legal precedent from some states, sound logical argument, 
and even some empirical evidence all suggest that courts should 
use a relative, context-based approach when explaining reasonable 
doubt to their juries. However, this collection of evidence may not 
be compelling enough to spur legal reform. The following study 
therefore empirically tests the claim that such an instruction will 
 
 118.  Elisabeth Stoffelmayr & Shari S. Diamond, The Conflict Between 
Precision and Flexibility in Explaining “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt”, 6 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 769, 776 (2000). 
 119.  Id.  
 120.  White & Cicchini, supra note 86, at 19. 
 121.  Kagehiro and Stanton, supra note 75, at 171.  
 122.  Id. at 174 (emphasis added). 
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provide defendants with more protection than an instruction that 
leaves reasonable doubt undefined.  
IV. The Study 
In order to test this legal theory of relativity, I designed a 
controlled experiment similar to those described earlier. Test 
participants read the identical material about a single criminal 
trial. They were then randomly assigned to groups, each of which 
received a different reasonable doubt instruction: Group A’s 
instruction left the concept undefined; Group B’s explained it using 
the relative, context-based approach discussed above. Participants 
rendered a verdict and then indicated their confidence level in the 
defendant’s guilt. 
Keeping all other things constant, the random assignment of 
sufficiently large samples to groups receiving different jury 
instructions isolates the impact of the instructions on verdicts. 
The following sections formally state the specific hypotheses 
being tested, describe the research platform and the test 
participants, explain the study design and methodology, and 
discuss the study’s findings.  
A. Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis is that when reasonable doubt is 
explained on a relative basis—i.e., by putting it in context with the 
two lower, civil burdens of proof—this relative, context-based 
instruction will produce significantly more acquittals than a 
simple instruction that leaves reasonable doubt undefined. (The 
null hypothesis is that the relative, context-based instruction will 
not produce a different effect on mock jurors’ verdict choices.) 
The second hypothesis is that, if there is an increase in 
acquittals, the relative, context-based instruction will also shift the 
tipping point—i.e., “the point at which the majority of participants, 
for the first time, vote[] guilty instead of not guilty”123—thus 
 
 123.  White & Cicchini, supra note 86, at 14. 
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providing defendants with more protection when jurors perceive 
the state’s case as weak. 
B. Research Platform 
To test these hypotheses, participants were recruited through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) online research platform to 
serve as mock jurors in a hypothetical criminal case. 
MTurk has many advantages, including “easy access to a 
large, stable, and diverse subject pool, the low cost of doing 
experiments, and faster iteration between developing theory and 
executing experiments.”124 Consequently, “thousands of 
researchers across the social sciences have conducted research 
using MTurk.”125 In 2015 alone, “social science journals with an 
impact factor greater than 2.5” published “more than 500” papers 
using data collected from MTurk.126 
Historically, test participants for behavioral research 
experiments have been recruited from a readily available pool of 
college students. MTurk samples are, unsurprisingly, “more 
demographically diverse than typical undergraduate 
populations.”127 Further, researchers have found that “MTurk 
participants provided data that met or exceeded the psychometric 
standards set by data collected using other means (e.g., 
undergraduate samples).”128 
C. Participants 
MTurk workers were required to have an approval rating of 
90 percent or higher to participate in this study.129 Additionally, 
 
 124. Winter Mason & Siddharth Suri, Conducting Behavioral Research on 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, 44 BEHAV. RES. 1, 1 (2012). 
 125. Michael D. Buhrmester et al., An Evaluation of Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk, Its Rapid Rise, and Its Effective Use, 13 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 149, 149 
(2018).  
 126. Id. at 150.  
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 149 (parenthetical in original).  
 129. See id. at 151 (discussing MTurk worker approval rating and its 
relationship to data quality).  
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because workers were recruited to serve as mock jurors, they were 
required to be jury eligible, i.e., U.S. citizens and 18 years of age or 
older.130 To further enhance data quality, participants were 
monitored during the experiment and their work was rejected if, 
after rendering their verdict, they failed an attention-check 
question,131 a reading comprehension question,132 or both. 
After data collection was completed, I discovered that one 
participant was not a U.S. citizen and several others failed to 
affirm that they were, in fact, citizens. Their data were discarded, 
leaving a sample of 379 mock jurors for the study.133 
This sample was large and diverse. Participants hailed from 
forty-five different states. Forty-eight percent were female. Their 
ages ranged from 19 to 71 years, with a mean (average) age of 38 
years and a median age (50th percentile) of 35 years.134 The ethnic 
composition consisted of 76 percent non-Hispanic whites; 10 
percent African Americans; seven percent Asian-Americans; three 
percent Hispanics; three percent mixed race; and one percent 
other. Fifty-three percent of participants reported having at least 
 
 130. At least one state, however, requires its citizens to be twenty-one years 
of age before serving on a jury. Juror Basics, MO. CTS.: JUD. BRANCH GOV’T., 
https://perma.cc/6MTW-3GZR (last visited Nov. 19, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 131. The attention-check question simply asked jurors to select the highest 
value in a row of numbers. Twenty-one workers selected the wrong number; their 
data were rejected.  
 132. In addition to a simple attention-check question, participants answered 
a more complex reading comprehension question about the study’s case summary. 
This multiple choice question included four possible answers, and participants 
were told to select all that were correct. Participants who selected A, the correct 
choice, were approved. Those who failed to select A were rejected. Those who 
selected A but also selected B and/or C, two incorrect choices, were also rejected. 
Initially, those who selected A but also selected D were rejected. However, answer 
D included two different components or claims, one of which was correct. Several 
workers who were initially rejected for selecting both A and D wrote to complain 
of the confusing sentence structure of D. This was a legitimate criticism; 
therefore, all 84 workers who selected A and D (and had not been rejected for 
other reasons, e.g., citizenship) also had their work approved and were included 
in the study. 
 133. To request the dataset of approved participants who were included in the 
study, email the author at mdc@cicchinilaw.com. 
 134. Of the 379 approved participants, six failed to provide their age. 
However, because all MTurk workers are required to be at least eighteen years 
old, their data were included in the study. 
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a college degree, while an additional 35 percent completed some 
college.  
D. Methodology 
To test the hypotheses, I used the case summary method. (The 
case summary method, including its strengths and weaknesses, is 
discussed in Part VI.A.) Every mock juror read the identical fact 
pattern describing a hypothetical battery case. The case summary 
began with an instruction on the charged crime, including its 
elements, followed by an 882-word synopsis of court testimony 
from three individuals: Emily, the alleged victim; Officer 
Hamilton, the responding police officer; and Dr. Wilkins, a clinical 
psychologist. 
The synopsis detailed how the police were called to investigate 
a disturbance at an apartment building. Officer Hamilton 
discovered that a husband and wife were the cause of the 
disturbance. The wife, Emily, made a written statement to the 
officer alleging that her husband, John, had battered her. At trial, 
however, Emily recanted the accusation and the prosecutor 
confronted her with her prior, inconsistent statement to the officer. 
In addition, Dr. Wilkins testified for the state and explained that 
recantations by abused persons are common. All witnesses were 
cross-examined by the defense; the defendant elected not to testify 
and the defense did not present any evidence. 
The case summary also included a 100-word general 
instruction from the judge. This instruction defined “evidence” to 
include not only sworn testimony but also statements that were 
read into the record in court. The instruction also explained that 
the weight to be given to any piece of evidence is up to the jurors. 
(The actual case summary used in the study is reproduced in the 
Appendix.)  
Before being asked to render a verdict, test participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two groups, each of which received a 
different jury instruction on the burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Group A was given a simple instruction where 
reasonable doubt was not defined or explained. The instruction, in 
its entirety, was as follows: 
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This is a criminal case, and the State (through the prosecutor) 
has the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If, after carefully considering all of the 
evidence, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, then 
you should find the defendant guilty. However, if you have a 
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty.135  
Group B was given the identical instruction, plus additional 
language that explained the burden of proof on a relative basis by 
placing it within the context of the two lower, civil burdens of proof. 
The instruction, in its entirety, was as follows: 
This is a criminal case, and the State (through the prosecutor) 
has the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If, after carefully considering all of the 
evidence, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, then 
you should find the defendant guilty. However, if you have a 
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
Some civil cases use the preponderance of evidence standard. In 
those cases, it is only necessary to prove that something is 
probably true, or more likely true than not. But this is a 
criminal case, and the State’s proof must be more powerful than 
that. 
Other civil cases use the clear and convincing evidence 
standard. In those cases, it is necessary to prove that the truth 
of something is highly probable. But this is a criminal case, and 
the State’s proof must also be more powerful than that.  
In criminal cases such as this, you can convict the defendant 
only if the State’s proof satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant is guilty. If it does not, you must find the 
defendant not guilty even if you think the charge is probably 
true, and even if you think it is highly probable that the charge 
is true.136 
 
 135.  This instruction closely mirrors the pattern instruction of the Seventh 
Circuit Federal Court of Appeals. SEVENTH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 
1.03 (2012). 
 136.  The last three paragraphs of this instruction draw heavily from the 
pattern instructions used in Arizona and Vermont. See ARIZ. CRIM. JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS NO. 5(b)(1) (2016); VT. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 04-101 (2005). 
The instruction tested in this Article was also proposed in White & Cicchini, supra 
note 86, and in Michael D. Cicchini, Instructing Jurors on Reasonable Doubt: It’s 
All Relative, 8 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 72 (2017).  
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After receiving one of the two reasonable doubt instructions, 
participants rendered their verdicts. Next, they were asked to “use 
a scale of 0% to 100%” to answer the following question: 
“Regardless of whether you voted Guilty or Not Guilty, how 
confident are you that the defendant committed the crime?” They 
then answered the attention-check question and the reading 
comprehension question. Finally, participants provided 
information about their age, citizenship, gender, state of residence, 
ethnicity, and education. 
E. Findings137 
To test the first hypothesis—that the relative, context-based 
jury instruction will produce a significantly higher group acquittal 
rate—we must compare the acquittal rates of Group A and Group 
B. 
Group A received the simple reasonable doubt instruction, and 
122 of the 181 mock jurors returned verdicts of guilt for a group 
conviction rate of 67.4 percent and a group acquittal rate of 32.6 
percent. Group B received the relative, context-based instruction, 
and 114 of 198 mock jurors voted to convict for a group conviction 
rate of 57.6 percent and a group acquittal rate of 42.4 percent. This 
is illustrated in the table below.  
 G NG Total %G %NG 
Group A (unexplained) 122 59 181 67.4% 32.6% 
Group B (relative) 114 84 198 57.6% 42.4% 
Total   379   
 
 137.  In addition to the primary findings discussed in the Article, there are 
several ancillary findings. For example, there was no relationship between 
participants’ ethnicity and verdicts. With regard to gender, men were more likely 
than women to vote guilty. With regard to education, participants with some 
college or a college degree were more likely to vote guilty than were participants 
who were less educated (high school diploma, GED, or some high school) or more 
educated (post- graduate degree). See infra Part VI.E for a discussion of how these 
differences are addressed through random assignment of participants to groups. 
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The acquittal rate did increase, as hypothesized. However, the 
next step is to determine whether this increase in the acquittal 
rate—a 30 percent increase under the relative, context-based 
instruction (.326 x 1.30 = .424)—is statistically significant. 
Significance is measured by a statistic called the p-value.138 
The p-value is the probability of obtaining the observed effect, or 
one that is more extreme, assuming that the null hypothesis is 
true.139 A p-value of .05 or smaller is generally considered 
statistically significant; a small p-value means the observed effect 
is inconsistent with the null hypothesis, allowing us to reject the 
null.140 
The result of this study—with sample sizes of 181 and 198 and 
acquittal rates of 32.6 percent and 42.4 percent—is significant at 
p < .05, with an exact p-value of 0.0496.141 In other words, if the 
null hypothesis is true (i.e., if the relative, context-based 
instruction does not have a different impact on verdicts than the 
other instruction), there is about a five percent chance (p) that we 
would obtain the observed difference or a greater difference (i.e., a 
30 percent or more increase in acquittal rates).142 This is strong 
evidence against the null hypothesis, leading us to reject the 
null.143 
 
 138.  Raymond Hubbard, Alphabet Soup: Blurring the Distinctions Between 
p’s and ’s in Psychological Research, 14 THEORY & PSYCHOL. 295, 298 (2004); 
ARTHUR ARON & ELAINE N. ARON, STATISTICS FOR PSYCHOLOGY 92 (3d ed. 2003).  
 139.  See Hubbard, supra note 138, at 298 (defining p-value in relation to a 
null hypothesis). 
 140.  For a general discussion of sample size, effect size, statistical 
significance, and p-values, see ARON & ARON, supra note 138. 
 141.  The p-value can be quickly and easily calculated using an online 
statistics calculator. See Comparison of Proportions Calculator, MEDCALC: STAT. 
SOFTWARE, https://perma.cc/PS9V-4EPR (last visited Sept. 20, 2019) (finding the 
difference between the two proportions produced a p-value of .0496) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). In addition, a statistical test for the 
difference between two proportions produced a z-score of -1.97, and the p-value is 
0.049. 
 142.  See Hubbard, supra note 138, at 298 (discussing the p-value and its 
relationship to a competing theory of statistical inference). 
 143.  See id. (stating that the “significance test[] revolves around the rejection 
of the null hypothesis at the p ≤ .05 level . . . .  ‘Every experiment may be said to 
exist only in order to give the facts a chance of disproving the null hypothesis’”).  
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Alternatively stated, the p-value measures the probability of a 
Type I error, i.e., the risk of obtaining a false positive when testing 
the hypothesis; in plain language, we are about 95 percent certain 
(1 – p) that the difference in acquittal rates between Groups A and 
B is a real difference and did not occur by chance.144 
This finding provides strong empirical support for the first 
hypothesis: that a relative, context-based jury instruction will 
produce a higher group acquittal rate than an instruction that 
leaves reasonable doubt unexplained. 
To test the second hypothesis—that the relative, 
context-based jury instruction also shifted the tipping point, i.e., 
“the point at which the majority of participants, for the first time, 
voted guilty instead of not guilty”145—we must look at Group B’s 
conviction numbers segregated by the participants’ confidence 
level in the defendant’s guilt. 
To begin, recall that several studies demonstrated that when 
reasonable doubt is left unexplained, the tipping point occurs 
somewhere between 63 percent and 68 percent confidence in the 
defendant’s guilt.146 The most recent published study, which 
 
 144.  While we can be confident there is “a real difference” between groups, 
this alternative explanation should not be read to mean that the difference will 
always be 30 percent. Further, while this alternative explanation is intuitively 
easier to understand and accurately conveys the relevant concept, it is open to 
objection on highly technical, semantic, and historical grounds. For example, 
many social scientists, psychology journals, APA publication manuals, and even 
“well-regarded textbooks on statistical methods” use the p-value to measure the 
probability of a Type I error. Id. at 304. This, apparently, blends concepts from 
two competing schools of thought: the Fisherians (p-values and evidence against 
the null) and the Neyman-Pearsonians (the Type I error and ). Id. at 297–304. 
Strangely, even though both of these camps “regard observed significance levels, 
or P values, as error probabilities, we occasionally hear allegations . . . that P 
values are actually not error probabilities.” Deborah G. Mayo, Are P Values Error 
Probabilities? or, “It’s the Methods, Stupid” (Second Install), ERROR STAT. PHIL. 
(Aug. 17, 2014), https://perma.cc/A7TB-SBXK (last visited Sept. 20, 2019) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Mayo sensibly argues that readers 
should not “be misled into thinking there’s a deep inconsistency” that prevents 
“using both N-P and Fisherian tests.” Id. Conversely, those who object to calling 
the p-value the measure of error rate bring to mind a saying about the narcissism 
of petty differences. At the very least, this debate is well beyond the scope of this 
Article and, apparently, even beyond the interest of most scientists, as “[u]sers of 
statistical techniques in the social and medical sciences are almost totally 
unaware of the[se] distinctions . . . .” Hubbard, supra note 138, at 304.  
 145.  White & Cicchini, supra note 86, at 14.  
 146. Supra Part II.B.2.   
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confirmed those findings, found the tipping point to occur 
somewhere between 60 percent and 65 percent.147  
In our study, Group B, which received the relative, 
context-based jury instruction on reasonable doubt, was comprised 
of 198 participants. The point at which the majority of these 
participants, for the first time, voted guilty instead of not guilty 
occurred somewhere between 70 percent and 75 percent confidence 
in guilt. In other words, the tipping point was indeed shifted, as 
participants in Group B required a higher confidence level in the 
defendant’s guilt before a majority of them voted to convict. This is 
illustrated in the table below.  
 
  Group B   
Confidence G NG Total %G 
Less than 60% 6 25 31 19.4% 
60% & 65% 2 9 11 18.2% 
70% 
5 6 11 45.5% 
75% 11 7 18 61.1% 
80% & 85% 18 14 32 56.3% 
More than 85% 72 23 95 75.8% 
   198  
 
 
 147. See White & Cicchini, supra note 86, at 14 (describing the tipping point 
where the majority of participants voted guilty instead of not guilty).  
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While there was a shift in the tipping point,148 it was not 
dramatic. Far from requiring the prosecutor to move the needle 
from zero to 90 percent certainty as many judges expect,149 the 
majority of jurors first became willing to convict when their 
confidence level in guilt reached somewhere between 70 percent 
and 75 percent. 
Interestingly, when compared to the simple, undefined 
reasonable doubt instruction received by Group A, the relative, 
context-based instruction received by Group B provided no 
additional protection for the defendant when mock jurors’ 
confidence in guilt was very low, i.e., when they perceived the 
state’s case as very weak. Mock jurors who were less than 60 
percent certain of guilt voted to convict at the nearly identical (and 
very low) rate, regardless of the instruction they received: five 
guilty votes out of 31 participants in Group A; six out of 31 in 
Group B. In other words, when jurors viewed the state’s case as 
very weak, the great majority of them voted not guilty regardless 
of their instruction. 
Once the mock jurors’ confidence level in the defendant’s guilt 
reached 60 percent, the relative, context-based instruction offered 
the defendant more protection throughout all confidence levels. 






 148.  The tipping point shifted not only when compared to previous studies, 
but also when compared to Group A in this study, which received the instruction 
that left reasonable doubt undefined and unexplained. Group A’s tipping point 
fell between the 65 percent and 70 percent confidence levels—slightly higher than 
that of similarly instructed jurors in previous studies, but lower than that of 
jurors in Group B. 
 149.  See Solan, supra note 31, at 126 (describing surveys that polled judges 
to ask their opinion on how certain of someone’s guilt jurors should be before they 
convict). 




   Group A     Group B   
Confidence  G NG Total %G  G NG Total %G 
Less than 60%  5 26 31 16.1%  6 25 31 19.4% 
60% & 65%  6 10 16 37.5%  2 9 11 18.2% 
70%  4 3 7 57.1%  5 6 11 45.5% 
75%  4 2 6 66.7%  11 7 18 61.1% 
80% & 85%  26 10 36 72.2%  18 14 32 56.3% 
More than 85%  77 8 85 90.6%  72 23 95 75.8% 
    181     198  
 
 
In sum, given these data, the second hypothesis is confirmed. 
The majority of mock jurors in Group B were not willing to convict 
until their confidence level in the defendant’s guilt reached a 
higher level: somewhere between 70 percent and 75 percent. 
However, instead of dramatically shifting the tipping point, the 
relative, context- based instruction received by Group B shifted it 
only slightly, but produced lower conviction rates throughout 




1478 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1443 (2019) 
V. Explaining Reasonable Doubt: It’s All Relative 
The Supreme Court has held that “a person accused of a 
crime . . . would be at a severe disadvantage, a disadvantage 
amounting to a lack of fundamental fairness, if he could be 
adjudged guilty and imprisoned for years on the strength of the 
same evidence as would suffice in a civil case.”150 Given this, and 
given that jurors find simple reasonable doubt instructions to be 
indistinguishable from the lower, civil burdens of proof,151 courts 
cannot continue to leave the concept of reasonable doubt undefined 
and still comply with due process. 
Instead, this study’s findings provide strong empirical support 
for what a small number of states are already doing and what some 
researchers recommend: to comply with due process, the burden of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt should be explained to jurors on a 
relative basis, within the context of the two lower, civil burdens of 
proof. 
This study demonstrated that Group A—which received a 
simple, undefined reasonable doubt instruction—acquitted the 
defendant at the rate of 32.6 percent.152 By comparison, Group 
B— which received the relative, context-based 
instruction— acquitted at the higher rate of 42.4 percent.153 This 
statistically significant 30 percent increase in acquittal rates 
demonstrates that Group B’s instruction offers more protection 
against conviction than a simple instruction that leaves the 
meaning of reasonable doubt to a jury’s imagination.154   
In addition to this finding, recall that previous studies also 
demonstrated that, when reasonable doubt is not properly 
explained, mock jurors are willing to convict when their confidence 
level in the defendant’s guilt reaches a mere 60 percent to 65 
percent.155 This confidence level is far lower than what is expected 
 
 150.  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (quoting In re W. v. Family 
Court, 247 N.E.2d 253, 259 (N.Y. 1969)). 
 151. Supra Part II.B.1.   
 152. Supra Part IV.E. 
 153. Supra Part IV.E.  
 154. Supra Part IV.E. 
 155. Supra Part II.B.2.  
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by those trained in the law, and is lower than what some courts 
have held to be an appropriate threshold for conviction.156 
The relative, context-based instruction tested in this study 
moved the needle on the mock jurors’ confidence gauge—if only a 
small distance. A majority of mock jurors in Group B did not vote 
to convict until their subjective confidence level in the defendant’s 
guilt reached between 70 percent and 75 percent.157 Instead of 
producing a dramatic shift, Group B’s instruction provided the 
defendant with greater protection against conviction at multiple 
confidence levels.158  
The relative, context-based instruction tested in this study is 
a vast improvement over the seemingly endless variety of defective 
explanations currently being spouted by the courts,159 as well as 
the simple instructions that leave reasonable doubt largely or 
entirely undefined.160 However, the instruction is not yet complete.  
In addition to the concept of reasonable doubt, the instruction 
must also discuss the closely-related concept of the presumption of 
innocence. This presumption is far more important in real-life 
trials, which typically last days and sometimes weeks, than it is in 
controlled experiments, which are over in a relatively short time. 
Given the length of real-life trials, it is also important to instruct 
juries on these concepts at the beginning, as well as near the end, 
of the case.161 This will hopefully prevent jurors from forming an 
opinion early in the case, and then taking that preexisting view 
with them into deliberations.  
Next, while the instruction tested in this study moved the 
needle to the point where mock jurors were 70 percent to 75 
percent confident in guilt before a majority first voted to convict, 
this is still not close to the 90 percent certainty that is widely 
accepted by judges as the requisite confidence level. Therefore, the 
 
 156. Supra Part II.B.2.  
 157. Supra Part IV.E.  
 158. Supra Part IV.E. 
 159. Supra Part II.A. 
 160. Supra Part II.B.1. 
 161. See, e.g., WIS. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 50 (2017) (listing 
preliminary instructions, which include Pattern Jury Instruction No. 140 on the 
presumption of innocence and burden of proof which is to be read right before the 
judge announces that “[t]he lawyers will now make opening statements”). 
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jury instruction that was tested in this study should be improved 
in two additional ways. 
First, other empirical research demonstrates that, when 
judges explain the reason behind a rule of law, jurors are more 
likely to follow it.162 The ideal instruction would therefore inform 
jurors why they must apply such a high burden of proof to the case. 
Second, the Supreme Court has held that, in order to convict, 
the jury must first “reach a subjective state of near certitude of the 
guilt of the accused . . . .”163 Because 70 percent to 75 percent 
confidence in guilt is far from near certitude, this important 
concept should also be conveyed in a criminal jury instruction. 
Therefore, a jury instruction on the burden of proof (and the 
closely-related concept of the presumption of innocence) that 
passes constitutional muster would read, in its entirety, as follows: 
 
Presumption of Innocence 
Defendants are not required to prove their innocence. The law 
presumes every person charged with a crime to be innocent. 
This means you must find the defendant not guilty unless, in 
your deliberations at the end of the case, you find this 
presumption is overcome by evidence which satisfies you 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.164 The 
presumption of innocence is not a mere slogan but an essential 
part of the law that is binding upon you.165 
 
Burden of Proof 
This is a criminal case, and the State has the burden of proving 
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If, after 
carefully considering all of the evidence, you are convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant 
 
 162. See Nancy K. Steblay et al., The Impact on Juror Verdicts of Judicial 
Instruction to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Meta-Analysis, 30 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 469, 486 (2006) (stating that jurors are likely to react to information and 
reasoning they can understand). 
 163. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979) (emphasis added). 
 164. This proposed language draws heavily from WIS. CRIM. JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS NO. 140 (2017).  
 165. HAW. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 3.02 (2014). 
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guilty. However, if you have a reasonable doubt, you must find 
the defendant not guilty.166 
 
Burden of Proof Explained 
Some civil cases use the preponderance of evidence standard. In 
those cases, it is only necessary to prove that something is 
probably true, or more likely true than not. But this is a 
criminal case, and the State’s proof must be more powerful than 
that. 
Other civil cases use the clear and convincing evidence 
standard. In those cases, it is necessary to prove that the truth 
of something is highly probable. But this is a criminal case, and 
the State’s proof must also be more powerful than that. 
In criminal cases such as this, you can convict the defendant 
only if the State’s proof satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant is guilty. If it does not, you must find the 
defendant not guilty even if you think the charge is probably 
true, and even if you think it is highly probable that the charge 
is true.167 
 
Reasons for Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
One reason for this high burden of proof is to protect defendants 
against the risk of wrongful conviction. Another is to promote 
public confidence in our justice system. Individuals going about 
their ordinary affairs should be confident that the state cannot 
convict them of a crime unless it proves their guilt with utmost 
 
 166. Id. This instruction closely mirrors the pattern instruction of the Seventh 
Circuit Federal Court of Appeals. See SEVENTH CIRCUIT CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
NO. 1.03 (2012). This instruction is identical to the language tested in this study, 
except it deletes the parenthetical indicating that the prosecutor represents the 
state, as this would be explained to a real-life jury through other instructions that 
are not relevant for our purposes. This instruction does not indicate that the state 
must prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, as that 
language should be included in the substantive jury instruction setting forth the 
elements of the charged crime. 
 167. The three paragraphs at the heart of this proposed instruction draw 
heavily from ARIZ. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 5(b)(1) (2016) and VT. CRIM. JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS NO. 04.101 (2005). This study tested these three paragraphs. See 
White & Cicchini, supra note 86, at 19–20 (arguing for these three paragraphs); 
Cicchini, supra note 136, at 85 (same). 
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certainty.168 Therefore, you must not convict the defendant 
unless, in your deliberations, you become fully satisfied or 
entirely convinced of the defendant’s guilt.169  
All of the language in this proposed instruction is accurate. 
And with the exception of three explanatory sentences that give 
the reasons for the high burden of proof, all of the language in this 
instruction is already being read to jurors in some states. And the 
brief explanatory language—a contemporary but accurate 
paraphrase of the Supreme Court’s reasoning—is included only to 
increase the probability that jurors will actually apply the 
reasonable doubt standard. 
While the proposed instruction is somewhat lengthy—without 
subject headings, it tallies 361 words—it also includes the 
presumption of innocence language on which some courts instruct 
separately. But this length is not uncommon,170 and some 
instructions greatly exceed it.171 Finally, 361 words is certainly not 
too long for what “is perhaps the most important aspect of the 
closing instruction to a jury in a criminal trial.”172 
VI. Study Limitations and Potential Criticisms 
Those who have an interest in preserving the status quo are 
quick to criticize scientific research if it contradicts their opinions, 
preferences, or wishes. For example, two recently published 
studies demonstrated that when a reasonable doubt instruction 
concludes by telling mock jurors “not to search for doubt,” but 
instead “to search for the truth,” they convict at significantly 
higher rates than those who received the same reasonable doubt 
 
 168. This proposed language is a paraphrase of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
363– 64 (1970).  
 169. This proposed language is a slightly modified version of N.C. CRIM. JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS NO. 101.10 (2008). 
 170. Many states’ pattern instructions reach the 300-word range. See, e.g., 
ALASKA CRIM. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 1.06 (2012) (containing 329 words 
for reasonable doubt and presumption of innocence instruction). 
 171. See, e.g., CJI2D[NY], MODEL INSTRUCTIONS: FINAL INSTRUCTIONS, 7, 9–10, 
https://perma.cc/2BL8-FMTF (PDF) (containing 632 words for the combination of 
reasonable doubt and presumption of innocence instructions). 
 172. State v. Aubert, 421 A.2d 124, 127 (N.H. 1980). 
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instruction but without the closing mandate.173 These findings 
should not have surprised anyone. How could the closing mandate 
“not to search for doubt” do anything except lower the burden below 
the “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” standard? Nonetheless, the 
response from prosecutors— a group that relies on that 
burden-lowering mandate to win convictions—was frantic. 
Prosecutorial criticisms of those studies included several 
poorly reasoned, knee-jerk complaints. For example, one 
prosecutor argued that the studies should be disregarded because 
they were biased in their design.174 The prosecutor elaborated:  
The first problem is that the entire premise of the [studies] was 
biased from the start. The authors were not searching for the 
truth: they were not looking to see what effect various 
instructions might have in a mock trial situation. What they 
were searching for was evidence to back their contention that an 
instruction that urges jurors to search for the truth will lead to 
more convictions than an instruction that urges jurors to search 
for doubt.175 
Aside from misstating the substance of the studies—neither of 
them tested an instruction that “urges jurors to search for 
doubt”176—the prosecutor attempted to spin the positing and 
testing of hypotheses, i.e., “searching for evidence to back their 
contention,” into a form of bias.177 However, as the trial judge in 
that case explained, “The positing of hypotheses is not bias, but is 
the first step in scientific investigation. The empirical results from 
sound methods are what inform. If the empirical difference . . . is 
statistically significant, the null hypothesis is rejected and the 
posited hypothesis is accepted.”178 
 
 173. Cicchini & White, supra note 47, at 1150–55.  
 174. Michael D. Cicchini, Spin Doctors: Prosecutor Sophistry and the Burden 
of Proof, 87 U. CIN. L. REV. 489, 498 (2018). 
 175. Id. at 498–99 (quoting the prosecutor’s argument in response to the 
defendant’s motion to modify the reasonable doubt jury instruction) (emphasis 
added). 
 176. Id. at 499. 
 177. Id. at 498–99. 
 178. Id. at 500 (citing the judge’s written decision granting the defendant’s 
motion to modify the reasonable doubt instruction).   
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Such bizarre criticisms are constrained only by a prosecutor’s 
imagination and boldness, and are therefore difficult to predict and 
nearly unlimited in their variety and number.179 In other words, 
these types of wild criticisms “are very much like landmines: they 
are easy to lay, but difficult and time-consuming to cleanup.”180 
Consequently, the balance of this Part will address only potential 
criticisms that are at least somewhat rooted in scientific thinking. 
To be sure, all studies, including this one, have inherent 
limitations and are susceptible to criticism.181 Possible limitations 
and potential criticisms of this study include the use of the case 
summary method, the use of a single fact pattern to test the 
hypotheses, the lack of juror deliberations, the possibility of 
participant inattention, and the possibility of participant bias. 
Some of these criticisms carry more weight than others, but each 
is addressed below. 
A. Case Summary Method 
This study employed the written case summary method. (The 
actual case summary, in its entirety, is reprinted in the Appendix). 
Case summaries are commonly used in behavioral research.182 But 
this methodology is not the best way to “approximate or mimic 
 
 179. Although most prosecutors do not realize it when they launch these types 
of attacks, their criticisms sometimes undercut their own argument. In the above 
example, the prosecutor criticized the studies in an attempt to discredit their 
finding. That is, the prosecutor contended that the studies failed to establish that 
telling jurors “not to search for doubt” lowered the burden of proof. Id. at 489. But 
if that is the case, then why would the prosecutor oppose deleting such language 
from the instruction? Once it is pointed out to them, some prosecutors are able to 
grasp the conundrum they have created for themselves; however, no prosecutor 
has ever explained why the offending language, even if it somehow did not lower 
the burden of proof, should be preserved. 
 180. Id. at 498. 
 181. For example, behavioral research is graded on four different measures of 
validity, and “when researchers take steps to strengthen one kind of validity, 
another kind of validity may be weakened.” Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. 
White, Educating Judges and Lawyers in Behavioral Research: A Case Study, 53 
GONZ. L. REV. 159, 183 (2017–2018).  
 182. See generally Wayne Weiten & Shari S. Diamond, A Critical Review of 
the Jury Simulation Paradigm: The Case of Defendant Characteristics, 3 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 71, 77 (1979).  
REASONABLE DOUBT AND RELATIVITY 1485 
  
features in the real world” of jury trials.183 Consequently, some 
researchers have argued for the use of more realistic trial 
simulations when conducting controlled experiments.184 The 
evidence and opinions on this matter are far from settled, however, 
as other researchers have failed to observe any differences in the 
decision-making of test participants who receive basic simulations 
compared with those who receive more elaborate ones.185 
A written case summary would not be ideal—and, in fact, 
would be inadequate—for certain types of experiments, such as 
testing the impact of the physical attractiveness bias on mock juror 
decision-making.186 But the written case summary method is 
certainly appropriate—and possibly even optimal—for testing the 
effect of written jury instructions, as this study did. 
The primary benefits of the written case summary method are 
its brevity and simplicity. While lengthy video-taped reenactments 
of trials, for example, are more detailed and realistic, they also 
“provide a myriad of additional legally relevant and irrelevant 
bases on which to make a decision . . . .”187 In the process, a single 
jury instruction could easily get lost in the clutter of the additional 
 
 183.  Cicchini & White, supra note 181, at 183.  
 184. See Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us 
About the Jury Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 589, 592 (1997) 
(“A better methodology is to provide a videotaped trial to participants.”). 
 185. See Geoffrey P. Kramer & Norbert L. Kerr, Laboratory Simulation and 
Bias in the Study of Juror Behavior: A Methodological Note, 13 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 89, 89 (1989) 
Results provided no support for the contention that treatment effects 
act differently as a function of the length of the stimulus trial in which 
they are embedded. Rather, it is suggested that treatments used in 
simplified jury simulations may often show similar effects when 
examined in more realistic, complex settings if the treatments are 
comparable. 
 186. See Marc W. Patry, Attractive but Guilty: Deliberation and the Physical 
Attractiveness Bias, 102 PSYCHOL. REP. 727, 727–32 (2008) (explaining why the 
written case summary is not appropriate in certain instances). The case summary 
method is not ideal for testing the impact of other types of evidence as well. See 
Shari S. Diamond, Illuminations and Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 561, 564 (1997) (describing that while certain studies, such as those 
that test “the credibility of various types of expert testimony,” demand “a fairly 
elaborate simulation,” other studies can be accomplished using “a less extensive 
trial stimulus”). 
 187. Diamond, supra note 186, at 564. 
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decision factors. By comparison, the written case summary method 
allows researchers to reduce this risk by increasing the salience of 
the jury instruction within the test materials.188 
Further, as one judge explained in response to a prosecutor’s 
criticism of the case summary method: 
[The criticism] is a red herring because in no way does not using 
live witnesses undermine the validity of [the study]. One could 
have presented live witnesses, but that would have been a 
different study. As long as the variable of the story told in the 
study was consistent among groups, how the story is told makes 
no difference . . . .189 
Nonetheless, future researchers may wish to test the impact 
of the relative, context-based reasonable doubt instruction on juror 
decision-making by using different methodologies, including 
audio-recorded readings of transcripts and video- recorded 
reenactments of trials.  
B. Single Fact Pattern 
When constructing this study, I valued simplicity of design 
and clarity of findings over nuance and complexity.190 The study 
 
 188. See Kagehiro & Stanton, supra note 75, at 162 (“Since the study was 
concerned with the effects of jury instructions, rather than with evidentiary 
issues, a trial summary was utilized to maximize the salience of the instructions 
concerning the standard of proof.”).  
 189. See Cicchini, supra note 174, at 509 (quoting the trial judge’s written 
decision granting the defendant’s motion to modify the burden of proof jury 
instruction).  
 190. My preference for clarity and simplicity was based, in part, on some of 
the criticisms I received for my previously published work. These criticisms, some 
of which are discussed briefly in this Article, demonstrated how little some 
prosecutors and judges understood about behavioral research and, even worse, 
how eager they were to form strong opinions and even publicly express them. 
Further, some criticisms were so baseless that they likely crossed the line 
separating mere scientific illiteracy from outright bad faith. For example, some 
prosecutors and judges launched multiple ad hominem attacks against me, and 
also inaccurately branded the Richmond and Columbia journals which published 
the research as unreliable “defense attorney journals.” See Michael D. Cicchini, 
The Battle Over the Burden of Proof: A Report from the Trenches, 79 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 61, 77–80 (2017) (refuting these criticisms). Consequently, the scientific 
illiteracy (and probably even bad faith) exhibited by some members of the legal 
community   influenced my choices in study design and statistical analysis for this 
project. 
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therefore tested the impact of a single version of the relative, 
context-based reasonable doubt instruction, and it tested the 
instruction’s impact on verdicts using a single fact pattern. In 
other words, it did not test multiple variations of the relative, 
context-based instruction; nor did it test the instruction’s impact 
in cases with varying strengths of evidence, i.e., weak- and 
strong-evidence cases; nor did it investigate the instruction’s 
impact on verdicts in cases charging different crimes, e.g., burglary 
or sexual assault.  
The study’s findings demonstrated that the relative, 
context-based instruction provided the defendant with more 
protection than the instruction in which reasonable doubt was left 
unexplained. However, we cannot say the extent to which, or the 
frequency with which, this will be observed in other studies or in 
real-life cases. 
This limitation is best explained by analogy. Researchers who 
survey a random sample of likely voters may be able to forecast a 
characteristic in the sample, such as support for a certain political 
candidate, to the larger population to determine the percentage of 
votes the candidate will receive (and whether he or she will win 
the election). Such projection is not possible with the controlled 
experiment presented in this Article. The most obvious reason is 
that, unlike the population of real-life voters who go to the polls 
and are choosing among the same candidates as the survey 
participants, real-life jurors will be faced with dramatically 
different fact patterns than those encountered by the test 
participants in this controlled experiment. 
To use two examples, many real-life trials will have very 
strong objective evidence of guilt (e.g., strong forensic evidence, 
several reliable eyewitnesses, or a non-coerced confession), and 
many will have very weak objective evidence of guilt (e.g., no 
physical evidence, no disinterested witnesses, and a highly 
impeachable complaining witness). In these strong or weak 
cases — which will comprise a very large percentage of real-life jury 
trials — the reasonable doubt instruction will not have any effect at 
all on verdicts. That is, the jurors will either convict (due to very 
strong evidence) or acquit (due to very weak evidence) regardless 
of the burden of proof instruction and, hypothetically, even 
regardless of the burden of proof itself.  
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However, it is important to keep in mind that, even though the 
burden of proof instruction will not have any impact in many 
real-life trials, “that is certainly not a justification for improperly 
[or sub-optimally] instructing jurors on reasonable doubt, only to 
hope they will view the evidence as falling near one of the two 
extremes on the strength-of-evidence spectrum,” thus rendering 
the instruction irrelevant.191 Rather, a trial judge’s duty is to 
properly, and optimally, instruct the jury from the outset.192 
From a scientific standpoint, however, given the inherent 
limitations of the study, researchers may wish to assess the 
generalizability of its findings by testing the impact of such 
instructions using different fact patterns that involve different 
charged crimes and varying levels of evidence strength. This is the 
scientific method at work. “The goal of social science is to arrive at 
conclusions that are supported by multiple converging lines of 
evidence, with each contributing study being necessarily flawed, 
but flawed in a different way.”193 
C. Lack of Juror Deliberations 
This study tested the impact of a jury instruction on mock 
jurors’ pre-deliberation verdicts—or, to be very technical, their 
guilty or not-guilty votes. When criticizing similarly constructed 
studies, many in the legal community have seized upon this design 
feature to argue that, in order to be valid, studies must include 
juror deliberations. This common criticism fails for several 
reasons. 
First, numerous published studies examine the impact of jury 
instructions on decision-making without the use of deliberations. 
In fact, “in mock jury studies, the jurors usually answer without 
deliberating with other jurors.”194 This study design feature is 
 
 191. Cicchini, supra note 174, at 507. 
 192. Id. Jurors are often instructed on reasonable doubt not only after the 
presentation of evidence, but also before the opening statements. 
 193. Cicchini & White, Truth or Doubt?, supra note 45, at 1160. 
 194. RON C. MICHAELIS ET AL., A LITIGATOR’S GUIDE TO DNA: FROM THE 
LABORATORY TO THE COURTROOM 243 (2008). 
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common and well accepted in the behavioral research community; 
the lack of deliberations in no way invalidates a study.195  
Second, in the broader context, beyond the narrow topic of 
burden of proof jury instructions, the research on whether and how 
juror deliberations impact verdicts is mixed.196 And when jurors do 
deliberate, there is evidence they spend a very small amount of 
their time discussing the burden of proof.197 Further, and perhaps 
unsurprisingly, “[t]he prevailing view . . . is that deliberations play 
a minor role in determining jury verdicts because the 
predeliberation majority generally prevails in the end.”198 
Third, the purpose of a jury instruction is to “accurately inform 
jurors about . . . the law that they are to apply in an 
understandable, conversational, and unbiased manner.”199 Similar 
to the point made in the previous Part, a judge’s goal is not to 
instruct jurors in a way that is incorrect, or even suboptimal, only 
to hope that juror misconceptions about the law somehow get 
cleared up during the course of deliberations. Consequently, 
 
 195. See, e.g., Ogloff, supra note 80, at 515 (“Participants were not given an 
opportunity to deliberate.”); Kagehiro & Stanton, supra note 75, at 163 (detailing 
the process of one experiment during which subjects answered questions without 
deliberation); White & Cicchini, supra note 86, at 18 (“[M]ock jurors in our study 
did not deliberate . . . .”); Bette L. Bottoms et al., Gender Differences in Jurors’ 
Perceptions of Infanticide Involving Disabled and Non-Disabled Infant Victims, 
35 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 127, 127–32 (2011) (describing how mock jurors 
participated in the study without any deliberation); Joanna D. Pozzulo et al., The 
Effects of Victim Gender, Defendant Gender, and Defendant Age on Juror Decision 
Making, 37 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 47, 47–54 (2010) (same). 
 196. See, e.g., Richard R. Izzett & Walter Leginski, Group Discussion and the 
Influence of Defendant Characteristics in a Simulated Jury Setting, 93 J. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 271, 271 (1974) (observing that deliberations mitigated the effect of 
physical attractiveness bias); Robert J. MacCoun, The Emergence of Extralegal 
Bias During Jury Deliberation, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 303, 311 (1990) 
(observing that deliberations exacerbated the effect of physical attractiveness 
bias); Patry, supra note 186, at 731 (observing that deliberations reversed the 
effect of physical attractiveness bias, i.e., mock jurors were biased against the 
attractive defendant). 
 197. JAMES R. P. OGLOFF, BRITISH COLUMBIA L. FOUND., FINAL REPORT: 
JUDICIAL INSTRUCTIONS AND THE JURY: A COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES 
(1998).  
 198. Diamond, supra note 186, at 564. 
 199. Model Criminal Jury Instructions, MICH. COURTS, 
https://perma.cc/4KK2-UPYS (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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individual mock jurors’ pre-deliberation verdicts and their thought 
processes are highly relevant and should be of great interest to 
judges and other lawmakers.  
Fourth, even if jurors were to spend a significant amount of 
their deliberation time discussing the burden of proof, there is no 
reason to believe that the deliberative process would iron out the 
numerous problems with reasonable doubt jury instructions. As 
discussed earlier, numerous studies now demonstrate that, unlike 
judges who are trained in the law and associate proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt with approximately 90 percent certainty, jurors 
are willing to convict when their confidence level in the defendant’s 
guilt reaches a mere 60 percent to 65 percent.200 
There are numerous real-life examples that support the 
empirical research on this point. In one state where courts are not 
permitted to define or explain reasonable doubt, a deliberating jury 
submitted the following question to the judge: “What is your 
definition of reasonable doubt? 80%, 70%, 60%?”201 The judge could 
only answer: “We cannot give you a definition it is your duty to 
define.”202 The jury convicted the defendant, perhaps with only 60 
percent confidence in his guilt.203 This demonstrates how jury 
deliberations, at least as they pertain to the burden of proof, are 
very much like the blind leading the blind.204 
D. Participant Attention Level 
A common prosecutorial criticism of the MTurk online 
research platform is that, unlike studies using college students as 
test subjects, it is difficult to ensure the participants are paying 
sufficient attention to the test materials. However, research has 
demonstrated that “MTurk participants’ attention is equal to or 
 
 200. Supra Part II.B.2.  
 201. People v. Downs, 69 N.E.3d 784, 786 (Ill. 2015). 
 202. Id. 
 203. See id. (“After further deliberation, the jury found defendant guilty of 
first degree murder.”).  
 204. See Greene, supra note 21, at 950–51 (discussing examples of juror 
misconduct in deliberations where jurors searched the internet or called a 
personal attorney seeking an explanation of the term “reasonable doubt”).  
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better than undergraduate participants’ attention.”205 In addition, 
as discussed earlier, several measures were taken to ensure data 
quality for this particular study. 
First, MTurk workers are rated,206 and participants for this 
study were required to have an approval rating of at least 90 
percent in order to participate.207 Second, based on the test 
materials, participants could complete the experiment in 
approximately eight to nine minutes. And the approved 
participants that were included in the study completed it in an 
average time of 10.2 minutes and a median time of 8.7 minutes.208 
Third, participants were given an attention-check question, and 
those who did not answer it correctly were rejected.209 And fourth, 
participants were also given a more complex reading 
comprehension question, and those who failed to answer correctly 
were also rejected.210 
In sum, much more was done to ensure participants’ attention 
to the test materials than judges typically do to ensure real-life 
jurors’ attention in the courtroom—a place where the stakes are 
high, yet inattentive and even sleeping jurors are widely tolerated 




 205. Buhrmester et al., supra note 125, at 151. 
 206. See id. (analyzing MTurk worker approval rating and its relationship to 
data quality). 
 207. Supra Part IV.C. 
 208. To request the dataset of approved participants who were included in the 
study, email the author at mdc@cicchinilaw.com. 
 209. Supra Part IV.C.  
 210. Supra Part IV.C. 
 211. See, e.g., State v. Chestnut, 643 S.W.2d 343, 346 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) 
(upholding the denial of defendant’s motion for new trial despite undisputed 
evidence of two jurors sleeping through evidentiary portions of trial). Jurors are 
also paid miserably for their important work. For example, in Milwaukee County, 
a large metropolitan area, jurors receive $8.00 per half-day of service, or about 
$2.00 per hour or even less, depending on how late the judge keeps them into the 
evening. Juror Duty, MILWAUKEE CITY COURTS, https://perma.cc/UR4X-5WPL 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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E. Participant Bias 
Finally, one of the more common prosecutorial criticisms of 
studies like the one presented in this Article is as follows: the test 
participants were not randomly selected and were not screened for 
bias; therefore, because the participants could have been biased, 
the study is not valid and should be disregarded.212 
This criticism fails for three reasons. First, test participants 
cannot be randomly selected and screened for bias, as these two 
things are obviously mutually exclusive.213 Second, this criticism 
confuses random selection (something that is used, for example, in 
surveys, where researchers use a sample to forecast the frequency 
of a characteristic in the larger population) with the random 
assignment of participants to groups (something that is used in 
experiments where researchers manipulate variables and test for 
differences between groups).214 As explained earlier, controlled 
experiments like this one do not attempt to forecast actual 
conviction rates in real-life jury trials; rather, they study the 
differences in conviction rates between differently instructed 
groups. 
Third, with regard to participant bias, one judge complained 
as follows when criticizing a similarly-constructed study: “You 
know, for example, do [the participants] have an interest in the 
case? You know, how is their intelligence? Did they essentially look 
like they had a bias? Well, anything of that sort, and none of that 
is referred to in this case.”215 The judge then argued that the 
participants should have been screened for such bias before they 
could be included in the study. Similarly, with regard to that same 
study, a prosecutor complained that because the researchers failed 
 
 212. See Cicchini, supra note 174, at 500–02 (discussing this common 
prosecutorial criticism in the context of similarly constructed studies). 
 213. Id. 
 214. See BETH MORLING, RESEARCH METHODS IN PSYCHOLOGY: EVALUATING A 
WORLD OF INFORMATION 173 (1st ed. 2012) (discussing how sample selection is far 
more important for a survey, or “frequency claim,” than it is for controlled 
experiments that seek to detect “associations and causes”).  
 215.  Cicchini & White, supra note 181, at 172 (quoting a transcript of a trial 
judge criticizing two published studies and denying the defendant’s motion to 
modify a reasonable doubt instruction).  
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to use a voir dire process to “weed-out those with preconceived 
ideas,” the research was invalid.216 
The call for this type of screening of participants in a 
controlled experiment is, at best, grossly misinformed. As a 
different judge explained when responding to this precise 
complaint: “If voir dire would have occurred, the sample would 
have been biased based on the subjective bias of the person(s) doing 
the voir dire (and striking possible study participants) resulting in 
the study’s validity being compromised by the subjectivity of those 
doing the voir dire.”217 
Further, this complaint about participant bias is much ado 
about nothing, as properly constructed experiments already 
address bias through the process of random assignment—a topic 
mentioned above. That is, when sufficiently large samples of 
participants are randomly assigned to test groups, we can expect 
that each group will have roughly the same proportion of men and 
women, the same proportion of old and young persons, the same 
proportion of educated and uneducated persons, and the same 
proportion of “biased” and unbiased persons— however that word 
might be defined—and so forth.218 
The benefits of random assignment are not just theoretical; 
rather, they are easily verified. With regard to this study and the 
identifiable personal characteristics discussed above—gender, age, 
and educational level—women comprised 49 percent of Group A 
and 47 percent of Group B; the average age of participants was 
37.3 years in Group A and 38.5 years in Group B; and participants 
with some college or a college degree comprised 79 percent of 
Group A and an identical 79 percent of Group B.219 
The point is this: when statistically equivalent groups such as 
these receive an identical case summary followed by different jury 
 
 216.  Cicchini, supra note 174, at 500 (quoting a prosecutor’s argument from a 
trial judge’s written decision granting the defendant’s motion to modify a 
reasonable doubt instruction).  
 217.  Id. at 501. 
 218.  See MORLING, supra note 214, at 251–52 (stating random assignment 
“creates a situation in which the experimental groups will become virtually 
equal”). 
 219.  To request the dataset of approved participants who were included in 
the study, email the author at mdc@cicchinilaw.com. 
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instructions, and then convict at significantly different rates, we 
can be confident that the difference was produced by the 
manipulated variable, i.e., the jury instruction, and not by the 
personal characteristics of the test participants.220 
VII. Conclusion 
The Constitution requires the jury to acquit a criminal 
defendant unless the state proves guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.221 However, this constitutional protection is only as strong 
as the trial court’s burden of proof instruction to the jury. 
Instructing jurors on reasonable doubt is risky business. Many 
attempts at a definition have created confusion or, worse yet, have 
lowered or even shifted the burden of proof.222 However, the 
solution is not to leave the concept of reasonable doubt 
unexplained. Empirical research demonstrates that, when left 
unexplained, the reasonable doubt standard offers defendants no 
greater protection than the two lower, civil burdens of proof.223 
Further, jurors are willing to convict with only a 60 percent to 65 
percent confidence level in the defendant’s guilt—a threshold far 
lower than what is expected under the proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard.224 
To adequately convey the state’s high burden of proof, courts 
should instruct jurors on a relative basis. By explaining proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt as being higher than the preponderance 
of evidence standard, and higher even than clear and convincing 
evidence, jurors will have the necessary reference points to 
appreciate how high the standard actually is.225 This relative, 
context-based approach is supported by a fundamental principle of 
 
 220.  See MORLING, supra note 214, at 251–52 (“After random assignment 
(and before manipulating the independent variable), you should be able to test 
the experimental groups for intelligence, extraversion, 
motivation— whatever— and averages of each group should be comparable on 
these traits.”). 
 221. Supra Part II.  
 222. Supra Part II.A.   
 223. Supra Part II.B.1.  
 224. Supra Part II.B.2 (“[I]n a 2007 study, test participants set the conviction 
threshold at a mere sixty-three percent chance that the defendant was guilty.”). 
 225. Supra Part III.  
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psychology (contrast effects), the existing jury instructions of some 
states, sound logical argument, the recommendations of other 
researchers, and now direct empirical evidence.226 
This Article presented the results of my controlled experiment 
where mock jurors read the same case summary and were then 
randomly assigned to two groups, each of which received a different 
instruction on reasonable doubt.227 Group A received a simple, 
undefined instruction and acquitted at the rate of 32.6 percent; 
Group B received a relative, context-based instruction and 
acquitted at the higher rate of 42.4 percent.228 
This 30 percent increase was statistically significant at p < .05, 
with an exact p-value of 0.0496.229 Further, mock jurors that 
received the relative, context-based instruction required a higher 
subjective confidence level in the defendant’s guilt before the 
majority of them were first willing to convict, and the instruction 
also provided the defendant with more protection throughout 
multiple participant confidence levels.230 
Based on these findings, and the findings from other empirical 
research, this Article presents a comprehensive jury instruction on 
the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof.231 The 
instruction is designed to fulfill the Constitution’s promise that 
every accused person remains free of conviction unless there is 
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
VIII. Appendix 
Below is the case summary that was read by all test 




 226. Supra Part V. 
 227. Supra Part IV.D. 
 228. Supra Part IV.E. 
 229. Supra Part IV.E. 
 230. Supra Part IV.E. 
 231. Supra Part V. 
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Case Summary 
Charged Crime 
This is a case where the State charged John, the defendant, 
with one count of battery. The crime of battery, for purposes of this 
case, occurs when all of the following elements are met: 
A. The defendant caused bodily harm to the victim. (“Bodily 
harm” means physical pain or injury or both.) 
B. The defendant intended to cause bodily harm to the victim. 
(“Intended to cause bodily harm” means that the defendant 
had the mental purpose to cause harm or was aware that 
his conduct was practically certain to cause harm.) 
C. The defendant caused the bodily harm without the victim’s 
consent. 
Evidence Presented at Trial 
The State, through the prosecutor, presented three witnesses 
at trial. The defendant elected not to testify.  
Testimony of Emily 
Emily, the alleged victim, identified the defendant, John, as 
her husband. They have been married for nearly six years. Emily 
does not work; she stays at home with the couple’s two children. 
On November 1, 2018, after John got home from work, they were 
arguing about child-related issues, and John got angry. Emily tried 
to get John to keep his voice down, but he would not. She believes 
this is why the neighbor in the next-door apartment called 911 on 
them.   
Emily testified, however, that her dispute with John was only 
verbal. She denied that John ever harmed her physically. When 
Emily denied physical contact, the prosecutor showed her a written 
statement and asked whether she had signed that statement on 
the day of the incident. Emily agreed that she had. The statement 
was then read in court, as follows:  
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“Today, November 1, 2018, I got into an argument with my 
husband John. Things got very loud, and he was very angry. I have 
never seen him get that angry, and I was afraid. John grabbed my 
upper arms and shook me. I have red marks and bruising on my 
upper arms from John doing this. I told John that he was hurting 
me, and he should stop it and let me go, but he continued to 
squeeze my arms for about thirty seconds while he yelled in my 
face. I did not give John consent to cause me pain or injury. I am 
still afraid and I want the temporary no-contact order enforced.” 
John’s defense lawyer then questioned Emily. Emily again 
testified that she had signed the written statement. However, she 
did not write the statement; rather, it was handwritten for her by 
one of the police officers. Emily testified that the officer gave her 
the chance to review the statement before signing it, but she 
declined. Emily testified that she was very angry at John when the 
police arrived— in part because of things he said during their 
argument—and she might have exaggerated some things. Emily 
also testified that the police officer may have gotten some things 
wrong, either because he was rushed or possibly to exaggerate the 
situation for his police report. Emily testified that John did not 
touch her on that day, and the two only argued.  
The prosecutor then asked Emily some more questions. Emily 
admitted that she had small, mild bruises on her upper arms, but 
does not know how they got there. She then said that she had a 
similar bruise on one of her calves. That mark was not caused by 
John either, and she does not know how she got that mark. She 
testified that all of the marks on her body were minor.   
Testimony of Police Officer Hamilton 
Police officer James Hamilton testified. He has been a police 
officer for six years. He responded to the 911 call and went to the 
apartment of John and Emily on November 1. He handwrote the 
statement for Emily. His practice is to always take down the 
alleged victim’s accusations as accurately as possible. He had 
never seen John or Emily before that day and has no reason to 
want to punish John.   
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Officer Hamilton testified that he gave Emily the written 
statement to review and sign, but has no way of knowing how 
carefully she reviewed it. He testified that Emily appeared 
frightened and also told him that she was frightened. Emily 
wanted to make sure John was not allowed back into their 
apartment until he cooled off, and she signed the temporary 
no-contact request.   
After refreshing his memory with his police report, Officer 
Hamilton testified that Emily’s right upper arm had visible red 
marks and bruising, and her left upper arm had red marks. Emily 
declined medical treatment and refused to be photographed, so 
pictures of the marks are not available. He testified that Emily was 
very clear that her upper-arm injuries were caused by John 
grabbing and shaking her, and that she did not consent to any of 
that.  
Testimony of Dr. Samuel Wilkins 
Dr. Samuel Wilkins is the director of a local shelter for abused 
persons. He has a master’s degree in social work and a Ph.D. in 
clinical psychology. He testified as an expert witness.  
Dr. Wilkins testified that it is common for an abused spouse to 
recant, or take back, a truthful accusation of domestic violence in 
order to protect the abuser from criminal prosecution. The reasons 
for recanting an allegation include the abused spouse’s desire to 
protect the family income and/or preserve the family unit. Often, 
the abused spouse will recant the allegation with the genuine 
belief that the abuser has changed and will not repeat the abuse. 
However, this often leads to what is known as “the cycle of 
violence.”      
John’s lawyer cross-examined Dr. Wilkins, who admitted that 
he had never met either John or Emily and had no insight into 
either of them as individuals. He also admitted that while there 
are reasons a person might recant, or take back, a true allegation, 
there are also reasons a person might make a false allegation in 
the first place. 
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Instructions from the Judge 
General Instructions 
You should base your verdict on the evidence. Evidence 
includes the testimony of witnesses, both on direct and 
cross-examination, as well as any prior statements of a witness 
that were read into the record or testified to in court. The weight 
to be given to any particular piece of evidence is solely up to you. 
There is no magic way for you to evaluate testimony or a prior 
statement; instead, you should use your common sense and 
experience. In everyday life, you determine for yourselves the 
reliability of things people say to you. You should do the same thing 
here. 
Burden of Proof Instruction 
See supra Part IV.D for the two different jury instructions. 
